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Pandemics, Paid Sick Leaves, and Tax Institutions
Alex Zhang*
The COVID-19 pandemic is currently ravaging the world, and the United
States has been largely unsuccessful at containing the coronavirus. One
long-standing policy failure stands out as having exacerbated the pandemic
in our country: the lack of a national mandate of paid sick leaves, without
which workers face financial and workplace-cultural pressures to attend
work while sick, thus spreading the virus to their fellow employees and the
public at large.
This Article provides the blueprint for a national, subsidized mandate of
paid sick leaves and two additional insights about our tax institutions as
mechanisms of effectuating broader societal goals. It first justifies a paidsick-leave mandate on the grounds of market failures (both cognitive biases
and externalities) and workplace equality. It also argues for the need of
subsidies in order to protect lower-income workers from unemployment risks
imposed by a national mandate. Second, the Article critically assesses the
current federal legislative approach utilized in the Families First
Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA). Third, the Article proposes designing
a national employer mandate of paid sick leaves funded by general-revenue
business tax credits and providing partial wage replacement.
This Article’s discussion of paid sick leaves yields two insights about our
tax institutions. It questions the role of payroll taxes, which are highly
regressive, impose burdens almost exclusively on labor, and are normatively
unjustified when the spending funded by payroll taxes benefits the broader
non-wage-earning public. The Article also reveals the malleability of tax
institutions with respect to funding, administrability, and costs. These
comparative advantages of tax institutions make them perennially popular
in times of crisis.

* Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2021; Yale University, Ph.D. 2018. I am incredibly indebted
to Christine Jolls, whose insights and mentorship made this project possible. I also thank Anne
Alstott, Nick Vincent, and the audience at Yale Law School’s Spring 2020 Tax Policy Seminar for
their feedback.
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INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic is currently ravaging the world. It has
infected over 90 million people worldwide,1 led to quarantine and stayat-home orders on an unprecedented scale,2 and resulted in millions
losing their jobs.3 The United States, in particular, has been hit hard by
the novel coronavirus. Although scholars have not yet systematically
investigated why COVID-19 has impacted the United States more than

1. See Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Pandemic, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019 [https://perma.cc/4TF7-7CE5]
(last visited Jan. 5, 2021) (reporting infections in 223 countries or territories and over 1.9 million
total deaths worldwide).
2. See, e.g., Executive Order No. 202.6: Continuing Temporary Suspension and Modification
of Laws Relating to the Disaster Emergency, N.Y. STATE (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO202.6.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MAG-9N9C]
(citing that the state, between January and March 2020, had the highest infection rate of the country,
leading to the state’s “vigilant efforts” to reduce infections).
3. According to Department of Labor statistics, in the week ending on March 21, 2020 alone,
approximately 3.28 million people filed initial claims for unemployment benefits in the United
States, the highest number in recorded history (the previous record was 695,000 in 1982)). See
News Release: Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, DEP’T OF LABOR (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/OPA/newsreleases/ui-claims/20200510.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6M9F-STHT].
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other developed countries, there are many plausible candidates to blame:
ineffective federal government response, including its failure to enact
social-distancing policies or distribute test kits at an early stage of the
pandemic; undercoordinated actions of the state governments in
containing the domestic and community spread of the virus; and the
impossibility of shutting down the whole country in a democracy.4
Among these factors, one longstanding policy failure stands out, which
both scholars and federal officials have recognized as having exacerbated
the COVID-19 pandemic: the absence of a paid-sick-leave mandate.
Unlike most developed countries, the United States does not require
employers to provide paid sick leaves to employees on a national level.5
To be sure, employers may offer employees access to paid sick leaves
without being required to do so: Starbucks, for example, announced a
nationwide paid-sick-leave policy in 2018.6 A dozen states and numerous
municipalities have also enacted paid-sick-leave mandates,7 which
generally entitle the employee to accrue paid sick hours on the basis of a
specific amount of worktime, up to a statutory maximum each year.8 But
at the end of the day, a substantial number of American workers—
approximately 24% of the workforce in private sectors, according to
Bureau of Labor Statistics, or about 30 million—does not have any access
to paid sick leave at all.9 Multiple prior attempts to fill this gap and
4. See, e.g., Experts Are Calling for a 9/11-Style Commission on U.S. Coronavirus Response.
Here’s Where It Could Start, STAT (June 29, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/06/29/usneeds-federal-commission-investigate-covid19-response-where-it-should-start/
[https://perma.cc/BSC7-NA7V] (noting that a broad review of the government’s missteps would
identify the lack of a national infrastructure to implement testing and contact tracing).
5. See Jody Heymann et al., Ensuring a Healthy and Productive Workforce: Comparing the
Generosity of Paid Sick Day and Sick Leave Policies in 22 Countries, 40 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVS.
1, 1 (2010) (finding that, among 22 countries with high human development indices, only three—
the United States, Canada, and Japan—do not require employers to provide paid sick days for
workers who must miss five days of work, and that the United States is the only country that does
not provide any paid medical leave for workers who must miss fifty days of work, for example, to
recover from cancer treatments).
6. See Starbucks Announces New Investments in Paid Leave, Wage, STARBUCKS (Jan. 24,
2018), https://stories.starbucks.com/press/2018/starbucks-announces-new-investments-in-paidleave-wage [https://perma.cc/E2XS-VPKQ] (reporting that the benefit will allow partners to accrue
approximately five days of sick leave per year).
7. See Suzanne Hultin & Tatiana Follet, Paid Sick Leave, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/paid-sick-leave.aspx
[https://perma.cc/PZ99-NW7R] (listing Arizona, California, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington as states
that require paid sick leaves).
8. Under the Connecticut Paid Sick Leave Act, for example, an employee can accrue one hour
of paid sick leave for every forty hours worked, up to forty hours each year (corresponding to one
week of paid sick leave). See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-57s(a) (2015).
9. See National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in the United States, March 2019,
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implement a federal mandate of paid sick leaves have failed. Most
recently, the Healthy Families Act of 2019 would have required
employers to let employees accrue paid sick leaves on the basis of their
working hours, but the proposed legislation died in a Senate committee
without much discussion or publicity.10
Scholars have long recognized that, without paid sick leaves, workers
may feel financial and workplace-cultural pressures to continue working
even if they experience symptoms of infectious diseases. These
symptomatic workers may then transmit the pathogen to their colleagues
and others with whom they have sustained physical contact.11 In times of
pandemics,12 of course, these concerns take on additional importance.
With an explosive growth of cases over large swaths of the country, it is
even more critical that workers have the financial capacity to stay at home
rather than risk infecting others. Each new infection has compounded
impact on the exhaustion of medical resources, given the exponential
nature of the spread of the virus.13 This risk is heightened in the United
States compared to other countries: most American jurisdictions embrace
the doctrine of employment at will, so that employers may terminate
employees for any reason other than for statutorily protected traits (e.g.,
race, sex, or sexual orientation).14 Millions of sick employees who are

U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.: BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. 119 (2019), https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2019/employee-benefits-in-the-united-states-march-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4ZW-8F8Z]
[hereinafter National Compensation Survey].
10. See S. 840, 116th Cong. § 5 (2019) (proposing that each employee earn one hour of sick
leave for every thirty hours worked, generally up to fifty-six hours of sick leave annually).
11. See, e.g., Supriya Kumar et al., The Impact of Workplace Policies and Other Social Factors
on Self-Reported Influenza-Like Illness Incidence During the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic, 102 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 134, 137 (2012) (showing that, during the 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic, the likelihood
of reporting a flu-like illness was significantly correlated to lack of access to paid sick leave).
12. Although there is no single accepted definition, pandemics are generally characterized by a
widespread geographic distribution of the pathogen and high attack rates (i.e., the number of new
cases in a given period divided by the total number of population). See David M. Morens, Gregory
K. Folkers & Anthony S. Fauci, What Is a Pandemic, 200 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1018, 1019–20
(2009).
13. While research on coronavirus’s contagiousness remains preliminary, scholars have tentatively established that the R0 value associated with COVID-19 is between 2 and 3, implying that
each infectious person can expect to infect two to three additional people. See Ying Liu et al., The
Reproductive Number of COVID-19 Is Higher Compared to SARS Coronavirus, 27 J. TRAVEL
MED. 1, 4 (2020). Any R0 value smaller than 1 means that virus transmission is likely to die out,
whereas any R0 value above 1 means that the number infected is likely to increase barring containment actions. Id. at 1.
14. See Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 85 (2000) (describing the employer as having “total dominance” over its employees). Further, antidiscrimination laws are obviously limited to the statutorily
protected traits. Id. See also Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (including
sexual orientation and gender identity within the definition of “sex” for purposes of Title IV of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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absent from work, therefore, not only receive no replacement wage but
also can be fired by their employers without legal consequences.
The federal government has recognized the importance of paid sick
leaves—at least in the context of this pandemic—and enacted, on March
18, 2020, the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA).15 This
Act requires all employers with fewer than 500 employees to provide two
types of leaves: (1) public health emergency leaves, where an eligible
employee is unable to work due to child-care responsibilities as a result
of COVID-19-related school closures;16 and (2) emergency paid sick
time, where an eligible employee is unable to work either because she is
herself experiencing COVID-19 symptoms or taking care of those in
quarantine.17 While some types of leaves are partially paid and others are
fully paid under the FFCRA, all are 100% funded by the federal
government—employers receive a refundable tax credit, equivalent to the
full amount of the wages paid to employees under the Act, to their share
of the Social Security Taxes.18 The FFCRA also bars employers from
retaliating or discriminating against employees for exercising any paidleave entitlements under or seeking enforcement of the Act.19
This Article identifies the need for a federal, subsidized paid-sickleave mandate, analyzes the current approach undertaken by the FFCRA,
and offers a blueprint for designing a permanent, subsidized paid-sickleave mandate. Its analysis also provides broader insights about payroll
taxation and using tax institutions to effectuate broader societal goals.
Although the labor market tends to provide employee benefits where
efficient (i.e., the value of the benefit to the employee exceeds the cost to
the employer),20 market failures, including cognitive biases and
externalities, and workplace equality help justify the mandated provision
of paid sick leaves. Concerns about unemployment, as well as political
15. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020) [hereinafter FFCRA].
16. See id. § 3102, 134 Stat. at 189−91 (stating, in addition, that the applicability threshold for
employers was modified from fifty or more employees to apply to those with “fewer than 500
employees”).
17. See id. § 5102, 134 Stat. at 195−97 (stating that full-time employees are eligible for eighty
hours of emergency paid sick leave and part-time employees are eligible for the time equivalent for
hours worked over a two-week period).
18. See id. §§ 7001, 7003, 134 Stat. at 210−12, 214−16 (limiting the amount of wages qualified
for a tax credit for each employee to two hundred dollars per day (of qualified emergency sick
leave) and $10,000 in aggregate per year).
19. Id. § 5104, 134 Stat. at 196−97.
20. See Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON.
REV. 177, 178 (1989) (“If employers and employees can negotiate freely over the terms of the
compensation package, they will reach a mutually efficient outcome. . . . [B]enefits will be provided up to the point where an extra $1 spent by employers on benefits is valued by employees at
$1.”).
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will, point to the need for subsidies. The FFCRA thus represents a major
step in the right direction of effectuating a federal paid-sick-leave
mandate. But it presents both practical and distributive problems,
especially given its enormous expected cost to the government—
estimated at $105 billion over its brief operational period of nine
months.21 After exploring alternative methods, this Article suggests
designing a refundable business tax credit, whose amount varies
depending on the wage income of the employee taking the leave, as a
superior (albeit still imperfect) mechanism of permanently subsidizing a
national paid-sick-leave mandate.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines the
justifications for a federal mandate of paid sick leaves, focusing on
market failures, externalities, the political and practical needs for
subsidies, and the role of workplace equality. Part II describes and
evaluates the regulatory regime introduced by the FFCRA. Part III
examines alternative models of institutional design for subsidizing paid
sick leaves, including prior scholarly proposals and § 45S, which the
2017 tax legislation22—commonly called the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
(TCJA)—added to the tax code, and which grants a general business
credit to employers with qualifying paid-leave policies.23 Part III then
provides more details about how the federal government can implement
a business tax credit for subsidizing paid sick leaves. Part IV, lastly,
examines implications and provides guidance on further research.
Overall, this Article aims to make one specific policy intervention and
produce two additional insights about tax institutions. The immediate
upshot consists in a blueprint for designing a national mandate of paid
sick leaves, which have proven particularly pressing given the COVID19 pandemic. But more broadly, the Article’s discussion of funding a
subsidized paid-sick-leave mandate should make us question the role of
payroll taxation in our government: payroll taxes are highly regressive,

21. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN DIVISION G OF H.R. 6201, THE “FAMILIES FIRST CORONAVIRUS
RESPONSE ACT,” 1 (2020) [hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, FFCRA ESTIMATES] (estimating the tax credits to cost the Treasury $89.127 billion in fiscal year 2020 and $15.728 billion
in fiscal year 2021). The tax credits are only available for on-leave wages paid between a start date
chosen by the Secretary of the Treasury and December 31, 2020. See FFCRA § 7001(g), 134 Stat.
at 212. Subsequently, the IRS and the Treasury set the start date as April 1, 2020. See COVID-19Related Tax Credits, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/covid-19-relatedtax-credits-general-information-faqs [https://perma.cc/J36V-WEPN] (last visited Nov. 11, 2020)
(explaining that the start date for tax credits to cover eligible sick leave will begin on April 1, 2020).
22. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (codified in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.)
23. See I.R.C. § 45S (explaining that the credit given is equal to “to the applicable percentage
of the amount of wages paid” to qualified employees who take this type of leave).
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impose burdens only on labor (especially lower-income households), and
are normatively unjustified when the spending funded by payroll taxes
also benefits the public at large. The Article ends with an explanation of
the comparative advantages of tax institutions in times of emergency.
I. THE NEED FOR SUBSIDIZED PAID-SICK-LEAVE MANDATES
This Part of the Article first introduces paid sick leaves as a form of
employee benefits. It then discusses justifications for paid-sick-leave
mandates, focusing on market failures, externalities, the political and
practical needs for subsidies, and the role of workplace equality.
A. Introducing Paid Sick Leaves
Access to sick leaves—whether paid or unpaid—is a form of employee
benefits, a large category of employment-related privileges including
unemployment insurance, retirement plans, and workers’ compensation
programs. Before addressing the pre-COVID-19 regulatory landscape of
paid sick leaves (largely a matter of state and local legislation), it is
worthwhile to note one threshold distinction. This Article concerns sick
leaves, as distinguished from family or medical leaves in their purpose
and duration. Employees generally take family leaves to take care of
family members or following the birth or adoption of a child; the
employees themselves, however, are generally healthy during family
leaves. Medical leaves help employees recover from their own serious
health conditions that require either continuing medical attention or
inpatient care,24 so medical leaves tend to last a substantial amount of
time (e.g., two months). In contrast, sick leaves tend to be short because
they are usually triggered by relatively minor illnesses (e.g., the seasonal
flu).
This distinction is important because a permanent federal regulatory
regime exists for family and medical leaves but not for sick leaves25: in
the United States, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) entitles
eligible employees to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid family and
medical leave while having their jobs protected.26 If the employee merely

24. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.113 (2020) (defining serious health condition as “an illness, injury,
impairment or physical or mental condition that involves inpatient care . . . or continuing treatment
by a health care provider” for purposes of the Family and Medical Leave Act).
25. It is also important to note that factors distinguishing sick leaves from family leaves trigger
different justifications for state regulation: an important form of family leave consists in parental
leave to take care of newborn children, and because women tend to bear much of the burden of
childrearing, paid maternity leaves may serve the goals of gender equality in the workplace inapplicable to a consideration of sick leaves.
26. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (describing the eligible reasons for leave as (1) the birth of a child;
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experiences a minor illness that does not affect her ability to perform the
essential functions of her job, then the FMLA does not entitle her to any
leave at all. Of course, if the employee’s mild illness develops into a
serious health condition that requires inpatient care (as COVID-19
sometimes does),27 then the FMLA kicks in and entitles the employee to
unpaid, job-protected medical leave of up to twelve weeks,28 as long as
the employee has worked for the employer for at least twelve months.29
But most workers who catch the flu or the occasional case of a bad cold
will not be able to take any FMLA leave because their illnesses are
unlikely to develop into a serious health condition that makes them
unable to perform the essential functions of their jobs. In any event, an
important concern motivating the adoption of paid-sick-leave mandates
is the reduction of infections that results from the worker’s increased
financial capacity to stay at home—a goal that the FMLA is unlikely to
advance since any FMLA leave is unpaid and provided only when the
worker’s health condition is sufficiently serious (by which point the
worker has likely already spread the virus to others).
These distinctions in duration and in the health condition of the onleave employee also have institutional-design implications, since funding
mechanisms and choice of implementation methods will vary for family
leaves (often long but predictable as to timing) compared to sick leaves
(often short but unpredictable as to timing).30 I address these institutional-

(2) adoption or foster care placement; (3) to care for a spouse, child, or parent with a serious health
condition; (4) a serious health condition of the employee that renders her unable to work; and (5) a
qualifying exigency).
27. See, e.g., COVIDView: A Weekly Surveillance Summary of U.S. COVID-19 Activity, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/covid-data/covidview/index.html [https://perma.cc/DK58-GFBN].
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (stating that the leave is applicable during any twelve-month
period).
29. It is notable that the standard for determining employee status for purposes of the FMLA is
not the regularly applied right-to-control test, which originates from tort law, but the more encompassing economic realities test. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Problem of ‘Misclassification’
or How to Define Who Is an ‘Employee’ Under Protective Legislation in the Information Age, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR LAW: REVIVING AMERICAN LABOR FOR A 21ST
CENTURY ECONOMY 143–44 (Richard Bales & Charlotte Garden eds., 2020). But employees must
still have worked for an FMLA-covered employer for at least 12 months.
30. In the context of disaggregating family and medical leaves, for example, scholars have criticized the FMLA for amalgamating the two types of benefits: while maternity leaves are predictable
in timing and length, serious health conditions that trigger medical leaves are harder to plan for
(though perhaps somewhat more predictable than the types of health conditions that trigger sick
leaves—it takes a much longer time to diagnose cancer than to find out one has caught a cold).
Degrees of predictability therefore counsel differing policy treatment of family leaves and medical
leaves, and the same logic applies to designing the paid-sick-leave mandate. See Julie C. Suk, Are
Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2010).
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design implications later in the Article.31
With the obvious exception of the FFCRA, the regulation of sick
leaves currently takes place on the state and local level: many
jurisdictions have adopted—either by legislation or by voter ballot
measures—paid-sick-leave mandates.32 Most of the state and local
policies provide for the accrual rather than a straightforward grant of
entitlement: employees in California, for example, can accrue one hour
of sick leave for every thirty hours worked, and employers are free to
limit payment to a maximum of twenty-four hours per year (i.e., three
days of paid leave for full-time employees).33 Most state paid-sick-leave
acts also feature anti-retaliation provisions that prohibit employers from
taking adverse employment actions against employees for using their sick
leaves,34 in addition to capacious definitions of employee status.35
These state and local legislative initiatives, while helpful, do not cover
the entire American workforce. As of the outbreak of the COVID-19
pandemic, only twelve states and the District of Columbia had adopted
paid-sick-leave mandates.36 More relevant to the purpose of this Article
is the fact that there is no reason to leave the regulation of paid sick leaves
to state and local authorities as opposed to the federal government.
Infectious diseases do not respect state boundaries, and there is very little
regional difference that results in differential needs for paid sick leaves
across jurisdictions—New Yorkers benefit from paid sick leave as much
as Texans.37 Recent developments in COVID-19 infections have

31. See infra Section III.D.
32. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-57s(a) (2015) (mandating employers to provide annual
paid sick leaves and permitting employers to comply with the law by offering other types of paid
leaves (e.g., paid vacation) that may be used for the purposes of sick paid leaves); WASH. REV.
CODE § 49.46.210 (2018) (requiring employers to have employees accrue one hour of sick leave
per forty hours worked and noting that employees may use the sick paid leave when their place of
business has been closed by a public official or for health-related reasons); see also Paid Sick Leave,
WASH. ST. DEP’T LAB. & INDUS., https://www.lni.wa.gov/workers-rights/leave/paid-sick-leave
[https://perma.cc/R992-PM8X] (noting that Washington’s paid sick leave mandate “was passed by
voters in 2016 as part of Initiative 1433”).
33. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 246 (West 2020) (noting additionally that accrued sick leave may
carry over to the next year).
34. See, e.g., id. § 246.5(c) (West 2020) (establishing a rebuttable presumption of unlawful retaliation when an employer denies an employee the right to use such leave and takes retaliatory
action within thirty days of the employee filing a complaint based on a violation of this statute).
35. Under state statutes, work-duration requirement for paid-leave eligibility is relatively lenient. California, for example, only requires the employee to have worked for the employer for 30
calendar days within a year. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 246(a)(1) (West 2020).
36. See Hultin & Follett, supra note 7 (describing the adoption of various state-level paid-sickleave mandates over the course of several years, from Connecticut in 2011 to Nevada and Maine,
whose sick leave laws do not take effect until 2020, and 2021, respectively).
37. Recent development of the COVID-19 pandemic has vindicated this proposition: while
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demonstrated this basic fact with painful clarity. While northeastern
states such as New York reported the highest cases in the spring, southern
states such as Texas and Florida broke new-case records daily during the
summer wave.38 New COVID-19 infections spiked in Texas and Florida
after they re-opened and workers returned to work—notably, neither state
has a paid-sick-leave mandate.39
B. Market Failures and Externalities
A federal paid-sick-leave mandate, subsidized or not, would constitute
an immutable rule that the government inserts into all employment
contracts in the United States. Unlike default rules, which generally fill
gaps in incomplete agreements, immutable rules are ones which the
parties cannot contract around in a legally enforceable way. That is,
immutable rules govern parties’ rights and obligations under a contract,
regardless of their intentions. As a result, scholars have argued that
immutability is justified only if unregulated contracting would be harmful
because parties, either internal or external to the contract, cannot
adequately protect themselves.40 Parties internal to the contract might not
be able to protect themselves because they suffer from, for example,
insufficient information or cognitive failures; parties external to the
contract might not be able to protect themselves because of negative
externalities—the contractual conduct of a party might hurt the legitimate
interests of the noncontracting public. But “protection” might not be the
most accurate term here: just as some contracts can result in negative
externalities, others might result in positive externalities that the
noncontracting public may desire to encourage (i.e., benefits that the
contracting party will not take into account because they do not affect
herself). In any event, two main types of considerations ground
immutability in contract terms: justified parentalism (e.g., because of
contracting parties’ cognitive defects) and externalities (whether positive
or negative). The intuition here is that the labor market, assuming no

early spread of the virus was concentrated in coastal areas with large, densely populated cities, rural
and suburban regions later experienced much more significant rises in cases and fatalities as part
of the summer wave of infections. See, e.g., A Deadly ‘Checkerboard’: Covid-19’s New Surge
Across Rural America, WASH. POST (May 24, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/05/24/coronavirus-rural-america-outbreaks [https://perma.cc/92LL-RDM2].
38. See Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura et al., Florida Breaks U.S. Coronavirus Record for Most
New Cases in a Day, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/12/us/floridacoronavirus-covid-cases.html. [https://perma.cc/W5B2-K5MH] (reporting that Florida, at the time
the article was published, reached the highest cases reported in a single day, over 15,000).
39. Paid Sick Leaves, supra note 7.
40. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 (1989); Lawrence H. Summers, supra note 20, at 178
(explaining the “parentalist” function of immutability).
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market failure, would provide employee benefits where the gain to the
employee exceeds the cost to the employer, because the employer can
pass the cost to the employee in the form of lower wages and the
employee would still be willing to supply labor.41
Previous scholarship points to the strong likelihood that a federal paidsick-leave mandate will result in substantial positive externalities in
public health. A recent study considers the effects of state and local paidsick-leave mandates in DC and Connecticut on leave-taking behavior,
finding that the introduction of mandatory paid sick leaves in those
jurisdictions has resulted in an 18% decrease in aggregate work absences
(a decrease of 0.5% from the national average absence rate of 2.2%).42 In
particular, the study points out that the Connecticut paid-sick-leave policy
applies specifically to service industries, which have historically lagged
behind other sectors in the provision of paid sick leaves,43 and finds a
statistically significant decrease in absence rates in nonservice sectors
that are not directly affected by the new state policy.44 When theorizing
why paid sick leaves would contribute to an overall decrease in work
absences, we might think of two main reasons: sick workers, by staying
at home, might, first, recover faster from their illnesses (and the speedier
recovery in turn enables them to return to work earlier) and, second, have
fewer occasions to spread contagious illnesses to others (and their
communities in turn see an improvement in public health). The former
benefits a party internal to the employment contract (the employee); the
latter is an externality effect that benefits parties external to the
employment contract. The analysis of Connecticut’s paid-sick-leave
mandate substantiates the latter, externality effect, since absence rates in
sectors unaffected by the policy also showed significant decreases.45

41. See Christine Jolls, Law and the Labor Market, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 359, 361–63
(2006) (explaining how employee benefits would function in a theoretical, perfectly efficient labor
market).
42. Jenna Stearns & Corey White, Can Paid Sick Leave Mandates Reduce Leave-Taking?, 51
LAB. ECON. 227, 227 (2018).
43. See National Compensation Survey, supra note 9, at 119 (noting that 61% of service-industry workers receive some form of paid sick leave in March 2019, compared to 76% of all workers
and 91% of workers in management and professional services).
44. See Stearns & White, supra note 42, at 235–36 (summarizing the study’s finding that statistically significant decreases in leave-taking due to illness occurred in all sectors pursuant to enactment of a paid-sick-leave policy—for the first two years of the policy in Washington, DC, and
for all three years of the study in Connecticut).
45. It is worth noting just how large an externality effect the Stearns & White study has shown:
when designing paid-sick-leave mandates, most policymakers would conclude that the policy is a
success if it does not encourage inefficient behavior such as shirking or absenteeism. Put differently, given the goal that paying sick workers to stay at home should not result in an increase in
aggregate work absences, the fact that Connecticut’s paid sick leaves produced an 18% decrease
in aggregate work absences shows that the improvement in public health must have been enormous.
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Other recent studies have confirmed this result.46
Employees may also suffer from cognitive biases that make them
undervalue the benefits associated with paid sick leaves. The most
prominent is optimism bias—human beings tend to overestimate the
likelihood of positive outcomes and underestimate the likelihood of
negative outcomes. For example, we underrate our chances of getting
divorced and expect to live longer than the average life expectancy, but
those beliefs cannot all be correct.47 Importantly for our purposes, fluvaccination literature has suggested that people manifest optimism bias
and often believe that they are invulnerable to the flu (or illnesses that
present flu-like symptoms, such as COVID-19) or at least less likely to
catch it than others.48 This cognitive defect has been unfortunately
pervasive during the current COVID-19 outbreak, with media reporting
many cases of college students partying on Florida beaches during spring
break, who all thought that the coronavirus would not infect them—
beliefs that ultimately proved to be largely incorrect.49 Of course,
misjudging the likelihood that one will be affected by infectious diseases
results in undervaluing the benefit of paid sick leaves—underestimating
the probability that one will take paid sick leaves makes the benefit
appear worth less than it actually is.50

46. See Stefan Pichler et al., Positive Health Externalities of Mandating Paid Sick Leave (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 15) (“[M]andating employers to provide employees with access to
paid sick leave can reduce negative externalities through lower flu infection rates. In the first year
after the laws’ implementation, ILI [influenza-like-illness] rates fell on average by 11% in states
that provided employees with the possibility to earn and take sick days, relative to control states
that did not.”). Studies have also found that other forms of employee benefits may engender large
positive externalities. See, e.g., Rafael Lalive et al., Market Externalities of Large Unemployment
Insurance Extension Programs, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 3564, 3566 (2015) (showing that a temporary
extension of unemployment-insurance benefits in Austria “induced a 2 to 4 week decrease in the
average unemployment duration of all non-eligible workers aged 46 to 54 compared to similar
workers from [control] regions”).
47. See, e.g., Tali Sharot, The Optimism Bias, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY R941, R941 (2011) (explaining that the tendency to overestimate the probability of desired events and underestimate the
probability of undesirable ones is a persistent human bias).
48. See Frederick Chen & Ryan Stevens, Applying Lessons from Behavioral Economics to Increase Flu Vaccination Rates, 32 HEALTH PROMOTION INT’L 1067, 1069 (2017) (discussing feelings of invulnerability to the flu as part of the optimism bias); Alex Dubov & Connie Phung, Nudges
or Mandates? The Ethics of Mandatory Flu Vaccination, 33 VACCINE 2530, 2533 tbl.1 (2015)
(surveying the “[c]ognitive biases involved in vaccination decision-making and potential nudges
that may alleviate their effect,” including optimism bias).
49. See, e.g., Patricia Mazzei & Frances Robles, The Costly Toll of Not Shutting Down Spring
Break Earlier, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/us/floridaspring-break-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/PH95-7QR7] (reporting on the Winter Party Festival in Miami Beach, the decision of state and local governments to allow it to continue, and the
resulting health toll).
50. In addition to the more familiar cognitive biases, employees may also undervalue paid sick
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Employers, in addition, may also suffer from information failures that
make them overestimate the cost (or underestimate the profitability) of
providing paid sick leaves to their employees. A recent study, for
example, shows that paid sick leaves reduce the incidence of nonfatal
occupational injuries—a fact that many employers, the study suggests,
may not recognize.51 More importantly, just as employees might exhibit
optimism bias and underestimate the likelihood of catching an infectious
disease, employers may miscalculate the extent to which a virus can
spread among its workforce and cause business disruptions, thus
underestimating the costs of not paying its employees when they call in
sick. Previous literature has focused on cognitive biases from the
employee side, primarily because it has posited that employers, as more
sophisticated actors, may and do take precautions to mitigate their
cognitive biases.52 The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that not all
employers completely mitigate their biases: businesses in the meatprocessing industry, for example, encountered significant business
interruptions because of coronavirus infections in their workplaces, but
many still do not provide any paid sick leaves to their workers.53
In the context of contagious diseases and paid leaves, externalities and
cognitive biases may exacerbate each other: younger, healthier, and more
mobile people tend to have the most optimism bias in thinking that they
will not catch the coronavirus.54 They will therefore value paid sick
leaves less (and even less accurately) than others. But they are also most
likely to bring the coronavirus to others because they are more likely to
leaves because they do not recognize the full extent of the positive externalities that can result from
this employee benefit. That is, even if employers can fully account for the fact that paid sick leaves
may reduce the number of sick employees, employees themselves may not understand this benefit.
Having fewer sick colleagues around the workplace is surely a benefit to most employees, who
would accept a lower wage given perfect information.
51. See Abay Asfaw et al., Paid Sick Leave and Nonfatal Occupational Injuries, 102 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 59, 61 (2012) (finding a nonfatal occupational injury incidence rate of 2.59 per 100
full-time workers among those with access to paid sick leave, as opposed to an incidence of 4.18
among those without access to paid sick leave).
52. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Employment Law, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
1355 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (“[T]he usual modeling assumption in the
case of an employer-side information failure is that employers are aware of the limits on their information and respond rationally to these limits.”).
53. See Kate Taylor, At Least 4,500 Tyson Workers Have Caught COVID-19, with 18 Deaths.
The Meat Giant Still Doesn’t Offer Paid Sick Leave, as the Industry Blames Workers for Outbreaks,
BUS. INSIDER (May 11, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/tyson-4500-covid-19-cases-asmeat-industry-blames-workers-2020-5 [https://perma.cc/TB5M-S9E4] (reporting meat-packing
plants as coronavirus “hot spots”).
54. While evidence for coronavirus-related optimism bias among youth has been largely anecdotal, previous studies have found that younger drivers tend to exhibit more optimism bias in evaluating their driving skills. See Melanie J. White et al., Young Drivers’ Optimism Bias for Accident
Risk and Driving Skill: Accountability and Insight Experience Manipulations, 43 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 1309, 1310 (2011).
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travel and come into contact with other people (while having fewer
financial resources to miss work if the leave is unpaid).55 Those who
undervalue paid sick leaves the most, therefore, also pose the greatest
risks for negative externalities (or, in other words, present the greatest
magnitude of gains in positive externalities should a paid-sick-leave
mandate come into existence).
The presence of large public-health externalities and various
information failures and cognitive biases helps justify a federal mandate
of paid sick leaves, which may result in overall efficiency gains.
C. Workplace Equality
Robust provision of employee benefits promotes workplace equality
by empowering certain marginalized groups in their course of
employment. The uneven distribution of workers across different
economic sectors and types of employers means that a federal paid-sickleave mandate can benefit disadvantaged demographics in the labor
market. According to Department of Labor statistics, workers in the
service, sales, construction/agricultural, and production industries—
sectors dominated by immigrants and Hispanic, African, and Asian
Americans—have lower-than-average access to paid sick leaves.56
Hispanic Americans, for example, constitute 24.4% of the workforce in
the service sector; 46% of the workforce in the farming, fishing, and
forestry sectors; and 37% of the construction workforce, compared to
their 17% share of the national population.57 Therefore, paid sick leaves
under the current setup of voluntary provision or state/local requirement
do not reach many of the marginalized communities. These data also help
explain recent findings that the absence of paid sick leaves increases the
risks of influenza-like illnesses in the general population but disparately
impacts Hispanic Americans.58 Further, the existing legal regime makes
it exceedingly difficult for workers in some of these economic sectors to
bargain for employee benefits collectively. Section 152(3) of the National
55. See also Jonathan Wolfe, Young, Confident and Flying, Virus Be Damned, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 13, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/travel/coronavirus-travel-deals.html
[https://perma.cc/N3KW-A8X2] (documenting the tendency of “cash-strapped young people” to
take up travel deals during the pandemic).
56. See National Compensation Survey, supra note 9, at 119 (noting that 61% of workers in the
service sector; 64% of workers in the sales sector; 59% of workers in the construction, farming,
fishing, and forestry sectors; and 68% of workers in the production sector have access to paid sick
leaves, compared to a national average of 76%).
57. See Labor Force Characteristics by Race and Ethnicity 2018, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.
38–50 (Oct. 2019), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-ethnicity/2018/pdf/home.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7YMM-L9NK].
58. See Kumar, supra note 11, at 135–37 (noting that all ethnicities reported inability to stay
home if they had flu-like symptoms, but that Hispanic Americans were disproportionately affected
by H1N1 and reported less ability to socially distance while at work).
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Labor Relations Act (NLRA) excludes agricultural labor and domestic
service workers from its definition of employees,59 and the fact that this
facially neutral provision disproportionately impacts workers of color is
hardly a coincidence.60 If a paid-sick-leave mandate is subsidized
through general revenue rather than through targeted social insurance
funded through payroll taxation, the policy will also serve the goals of
distributive justice and provide lower-income workers with an important
employee benefit without substantially depressing their wages.61
The current COVID-19 pandemic, in particular, has confirmed the
disparate impact of a public health crisis across demographic groups and
the need for a subsidized mandate of paid sick leaves. Early data from the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have shown that all minority
groups, including Hispanic, Black, Asian, and Native Americans, have
higher age-adjusted COVID-19-associated hospitalization rates
compared to non-Hispanic white Americans.62 The differential in
hospitalization rates reflects both long-standing social inequities in
medical treatment and different groups’ access to paid sick leaves,63 so
that minorities are, ex ante, more likely to catch the coronavirus because
members of their communities have diminished financial capacity to stay
at home while sick and, ex post, less likely to receive effective treatment
because of implicit bias and cultural barriers in medical institutions.
Preventing the spread of a virus ex ante is at least as important as—if not
much more important than—repairing our medical institutions ex post.
Paid sick leaves would be instrumental for the former goal.

59. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (“The term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include any individual employed as
an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home.”).
60. See generally Juan F. Perea, The Echoes of Slavery: Recognizing the Racist Origins of the
Agricultural and Domestic Worker Exclusion from the National Labor Relations Act, 72 OHIO ST.
L.J. 95 (2011).
61. See also infra Section III.B.
62. Health Equity Considerations and Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 24, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/racial-ethnic-minorities.html [https://perma.cc/J5HA-5CB4] (suggesting racial disparities in the effects of COVID-19 in the United States); see also Eboni G. Price-Haywood et al.,
Hospitalization and Mortality Among Black Patients and White Patients with Covid-19, 382 NEW
ENGLAND J. MED. 2534, 2534 (2020) (finding that being Black was associated with increased probability of being hospitalized with COVID-19, though not with increased mortality once hospitalized).
63. Cato T. Laurencin & Aneesah McClinton, The COVID-19 Pandemic: A Call to Action to
Identify and Address Racial and Ethnic Disparities, 7 J. RACIAL & ETHIC HEALTH DISPARITIES
398 (2020).
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D. Tax Subsidies
Before discussing the current approaches to subsidizing paid sick
leaves (and how to design a more optimal regime if the current
approaches are defective), there is a threshold question of whether the
government should subsidize paid sick leaves through the tax system, or
at all. I first address the general issue of subsidization and then proceed
to the question of using the tax system.
First, government subsidies may be justified because employers’
provisions of paid sick leaves can both generate large, positive
externalities and advance the goals of workplace equality.64 The presence
of positive externalities means that the broader public, which is not a
party to the employment contracts, stands to benefit when workers have
access to paid sick leaves. Advancing workplace equality and
empowering targeted demographic groups may provide an additional
ground for the government to pay part of the cost. Second, and perhaps
more relevant to our current crisis, there is simply no political will behind
requiring employers to offer additional benefits to employees without
government assistance in the current economic environment. By the end
of the second month of the COVID-19 outbreak, over 26 million
American workers had filed for unemployment insurance.65 Economic
output dropped by nearly 33% in the second quarter and would unlikely
recover in 2020.66 Congress is largely occupied with drafting stimulus
bills, rather than considering imposing additional regulatory regimes on
businesses with substantial compliance costs. Many workers who lack
access to paid sick leaves are employed by small businesses, 67 which
Congress has proven especially reluctant to subject to various protective
statutes in the past. For example, the FMLA only covers employers with
fifty or more employees,68 and even antidiscrimination statutes, such as
the ADA and Title VII, only cover employers with fifteen or more
64. See supra Sections II.A & II.B.
65. See News Release: Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR 1 (Apr.
23, 2020), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/OPA/newsreleases/ui-claims/20200691.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YE43-YDPA] (disclosing that seasonally adjusted insured unemployment was at
its highest level since such records began to be kept).
66. See Gross Domestic Product, 2nd Quarter 2020 (Advance Estimate) and Annual Update,
U.S. BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS (July 30, 2020), https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/gross-domesticproduct-2nd-quarter-2020-advance-estimate-and-annual-update [https://perma.cc/LV3T-LW3X]
(explaining that the decrease in real GDP reflects the decreases in personal consumption expenditures, exports, investments, and governmental spending which is offset by increased federal spending).
67. Only 64%, compared to a national average of 76%, of workers employed by firms with
between one and forty-nine employees have access to paid sick leaves. The vast majority (91%) of
employees who work for large employers (i.e., those with more than 500 employees) has access to
some form of paid sick leaves. See National Compensation Survey, supra note 9, at 120.
68. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(a)(i).

2021]

Pandemics, Paid Sick Leaves, and Tax Institutions

399

employees.69 Should Congress enact a permanent paid-sick-leave
mandate in response to the coronavirus pandemic, it would very likely
provide some type of support to small businesses, as it did in the FFCRA.
Since lower-income workers in particular lack access to paid sick
leaves, concerns with unemployment may constitute an additional reason
for subsidizing paid-sick-leave mandates. In a competitive labor market,
employers will pass the cost of providing the mandated employee benefit
to workers and lower their wages. But for low-income workers, this may
not be possible, since employers cannot legally pass on the cost and lower
their wages below the minimum wage required by the federal or state
governments.70 The dual presence of minimum-wage and paid-sick-leave
mandates, therefore, may create unemployment—an unintended
consequence that is even more likely now as states and localities have
pushed for higher minimum wages in the past decade of economic
growth.71 This problem is especially concerning because the COVID-19
pandemic has already created massive unemployment. Pandemic-related
unemployment has affected minority groups more than the general
population,72 so mechanisms of preventing further unemployment or
wage depression (e.g., federal subsidies) may also be justified on the
additional normative basis of empowering marginalized workers in their
course of employment. If the government at least partially funds the
provision of paid sick leaves, mandating the benefit will be less likely to
create unemployment or depress wages.
Even if government subsidies are justified or politically necessary,
policymakers should consider whether to use tax institutions to
implement the subsidy. Traditional scholarship characterizes the tax
system as primarily (or even solely) fulfilling a revenue-raising function
and counsels against using the tax system to subsidize or implement
regulatory policy. Scholars advocating a comprehensive tax base have
contended that distributing government resources in the form of a tax
concession is inefficient, poses difficulties in administrability, and
shields the government from accountability by hiding spending in the tax

69. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
70. See Lawrence H. Summers, supra note 20, at 181 (noting the problem mandates encounter
when they collide with other rigid mandates, such as minimum wage, that already distort the labor
market for lower-wage workers).
71. New York City, for example, sets a minimum wage of $15/hour. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 652
(McKinney 2020).
72. See Laura Montenovo et al., Determinants of Disparities in COVID-19 Job Losses 2 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27132, 2020) (finding disparately higher unemployment in the first two full months of the pandemic for Hispanic workers).
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code.73 Other scholars have identified tax incentives as tax
expenditures—deviations from a normal income tax that are equivalent,
in financial terms, to (but have multiple disadvantages compared to)
direct spending programs.74
In recent years, however, the winds have shifted, perhaps as a result of
the recognition that the federal government has used—and continues to
use—the tax system to implement major policies ranging from health
care75 to home-ownership.76 Whether to implement a policy through tax,
scholars now argue, is a matter of institutional design and how best to
compartmentalize government functions to provide the best set of public
services.77 In other words, the mere fact that administering a federal
policy complicates the tax system is not enough reason to reject the
approach. Rather, policymakers should engage in an analysis of whether
the coordination benefits resulting from integrating the spending program
with the tax system exceed the specialization benefits of creating a
separate agency to administer the program.78 Social programs whose
operation requires income measurement, for example, may be better
implemented through tax institutions that have expertise in that area. In
addition, scholars have convincingly identified advantages and
weaknesses unique to implementing nontax policies through tax
institutions, most prominently by analyzing the popular Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC), which grants individual income tax credits to working
people with low or moderate income.79 Compared to direct spending

73. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax Reform,
80 HARV. L. REV. 925, 926 (1967) (describing, but not supporting, the view that “a tax concession
is a poor way to distribute a government bounty or to encourage activities that are in the public
interest: the value of the concession varies with the beneficiary’s tax status, the impact of the program may be erratic and unpredictable, its cost cannot be accurately estimated or budgeted in advance, and its operation is covert rather than open to public inspection and criticism”); see also
R.A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44 (1967) (responding to
Professor Bittker’s criticism of the comprehensive-tax-base literature).
74. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX
EXPENDITURES 92–125, 140 (1973) (surveying the “waste, inefficiency, and inequity” associated
with tax expenditures and implementing regulatory programs through tax incentives).
75. See I.R.C. § 36B (providing a tax credit for purchasing qualified health plans).
76. See I.R.C. § 163 (providing a tax deduction for mortgage interest on qualified residences).
77. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs,
113 YALE L.J. 955, 957 (2004) (arguing that when governments combine taxing and spending programs, the salient question is one of institutional design—i.e., assigning different tasks to different
units of government for optimal performance).
78. See id. at 959 (noting that there is a tradeoff between coordinating a program with the tax
structure and the benefits of having a specialized agency to administer the program).
79. The amount of EITC to which the taxpayer is entitled is a fixed percentage of her wage
income until the credit reaches a statutory maximum, at which point the amount stays constant for
a specified income level (depending on the number of the taxpayer’s children) before it phases out.
See I.R.C. § 32.
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programs such as social insurance, advantages associated with tax
institutions include greater accessibility, cheaper administration, and
reduced stigma for recipients of the benefits; on the other hand, utilizing
tax institutions may also result in less accurate targeting of the
beneficiaries, lack of responsiveness to changing circumstances, and
either noncompliance or insufficient participation.80 These
considerations present additional factors that may weigh for or against
subsidizing a paid-sick-leave mandate through tax credits, which I
address later in the Article.81
II. THE CURRENT APPROACH: FFCRA
A. The Regulatory Framework
Enacted on March 18, 2020, the FFCRA is one of the federal
government’s first responses to the current COVID-19 pandemic and
creates two sets of temporary paid-sick-leave mandates, both set to expire
at the end of 2020.82 The first portion of the FFCRA, the Emergency
Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act (EFMLEA), amends the
FMLA and requires employers (with fewer than 500 employees) to
provide partially paid “public health emergency leave” to eligible
employees.83 Employees may take public health emergency leaves when
they are unable to work because they need to take care of non-adult
children due to coronavirus-related school closures.84 The second portion
of the FFCRA, the Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act (EPSLA), requires
employers to provide paid “emergency paid sick leave” to eligible
employees (i.e., those employed by the employer for at least thirty
calendar days).85 The ESPLA establishes two tiers of reasons that entitle
an employee to emergency paid leave: under the first tier, the employee
is unable to work because the employee herself is under a quarantine
order, advised to self-quarantine by a healthcare provider, or
experiencing COVID-19 symptoms;86 under the second tier, the
80. See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 589 (1995).
81. See infra Sections III.B (discussing financing through the payroll tax versus general revenue), III.C (discussing implementation through social-insurance programs versus employer mandates with tax subsidies), and III.D (discussing distribution with respect to determining the appropriate subsidy and wage-replacement levels).
82. FFCRA, Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020).
83. See FFCRA § 3102, 134 Stat. at 189–90 (defining the public health emergency related to
COVID-19 and expanding the employer threshold required to provide paid sick leave).
84. See id. (defining the need to care for a child whose school is closed due to coronavirus as a
qualifying need related to the public health emergency).
85. See FFCRA § 5102, 134 Stat. at 195 (requiring that employers provide emergency paid sick
leave to employees for reasons related to COVID-19).
86. See FFCRA § 5102(a)(1)–(3), 134 Stat. at 195.
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employee is unable to work because she has to care for others affected by
COVID-19 or her school-age children, or because she is experiencing
substantially similar situations.87 For both tiers, the ESPLA entitles fulltime employees to eighty hours of paid leave and part-time employees to
paid leave equivalent in length to their average hours worked in a twoweek period.88 The amounts of replacement wage, however, differ
depending on employee’s reason for taking the leave. Under the
regulations subsequently promulgated by the Department of Labor,
employers must pay on-leave workers who fall under the first tier of the
EPSLA 100% of their regular wages, up to a maximum of $511 per day;
in contrast, employers only have to pay on-leave workers who fall under
the second tier of the EPSLA two-thirds of their regular wages, up to a
maximum of $200 per day.89 The EPSLA also bars employers from
retaliating or discriminating against employees for exercising any paidleave entitlements under or seeking enforcement of the Act.90
Of particular relevance to this Article is the first tier of leaves
established by the ESPLA. The “public health emergency leave”
established by the EFMLEA is not technically sick leave and is more akin
to family leave: the employee is entitled to partially paid leave (at twothirds of regular wages) on the basis of coronavirus-related school
closures and can be (and in most cases likely is) perfectly healthy while
on leave. The second tier of “emergency paid sick leave” established by
the ESPLA is also akin to family leave: the employee is entitled to
partially paid leave on the basis of family members affected by COVID19 and, again, can be (and in most cases likely is) perfectly healthy while
on leave. Of course, this is not to say that these family leaves are not
valuable—the point is that the framework established earlier in this
Article for subsidizing paid sick leaves91 (e.g., with respect to
externalities and cognitive biases) will not fully apply to analyzing these
two types of leaves because the workers in both instances are not
necessarily sick themselves. In contrast, the first tier of “emergency paid
sick leave” established by the ESPLA is truer to its name: the employee
must be either sick herself (i.e., experience COVID-19 symptoms) or
subject to quarantine by order of local government or upon advice of

87. See FFCRA § 5102(a)(4)–(6), 134 Stat. at 195–96.
88. See FFCRA § 5102(b), 134 Stat. at 196 (establishing the duration of the emergency paid
sick leave time under the EPSLA).
89. See Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 19,326,
19,327 (Apr. 6, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 826).
90. FFCRA § 5104, 134 Stat. at 196–97.
91. See supra Part I (discussing the need for paid sick leaves, the associated positive externalities, and the cognitive biases that make both employees and employers underestimate the benefits
of paid sick leaves).
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healthcare officials (probably because the employee had a substantial
likelihood of exposure to the coronavirus or is already exhibiting enough
COVID-19 symptoms to seek medical attention).
All leaves taken under the first tier of the ESPLA (i.e., true sick leaves)
are fully paid and fully funded by the government, up to $511 per day for
two weeks. The government funding comes in as reimbursement, after
the employer has already paid the on-leave employees, in the form of a
payroll tax credit to the employer-collected portion of the Social Security
Tax.92 The credit is refundable: in any given tax period, if the amount of
FFCRA tax credits exceeds the employer’s share of the Social Security
Tax, the IRS treats the excess as overpayment and will refund the whole
excess to the employer.93 It is notable that the tax credits are only
available when the employee’s inability to work is caused directly (and
solely) by one of the statutorily specified reasons.94 For example, if the
employer has temporarily closed down the business or reduced work
hours due to decreased consumer demand during the pandemic, the
employer will not be able to receive any payroll tax credits to offset wages
paid to on-leave employees even if they experience COVID-19
symptoms, because the employee’s health condition is only one of the
causes of her undertaking the leave.
B. Potential Problems with FFCRA: Costs, Incidence, Coverage, and
Windfalls
The FFCRA represents a major step in the right direction: it sets up a
(temporary) national mandate of paid sick leaves, which addresses the
labor market’s potential underprovision of paid sick leaves due to various
forms of market failures, such as cognitive biases and externalities;95 it
offers full subsidies for the mandated provision of paid sick leaves, which
should at least diminish the risk of generating unemployment;96 and by
covering only small- and medium-sized employers (those with fewer than
500 employees),97 it targets those employees least likely to have access

92. See FFCRA § 7001, § 7003, 134 Stat. at 210–12, 214–16 (stating that the employer will be
reimbursed for 100 percent of the cost of qualified sick leaves through credits against payroll taxes).
93. See COVID-19-Related Tax Credits, supra note 21 (stating that if an employer pays more
in qualified sick leaves than their share of the Social Security tax, the excess over their share of tax
liabilities will be refunded).
94. See Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg. at 19,329–
30 (describing the six statutory reasons under which an employee is eligible for paid sick leave
under the FFCRA).
95. See supra Section I.B.
96. See supra Section I.D.
97. FFCRA § 5110, 134 Stat. at 199.
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to paid sick leaves.98 But there are significant problems with the FFCRA
that prevent it from evolving into a model for permanently subsidizing
paid sick leaves. This Section examines these potential problems.
Most conspicuously, the current regime is extremely expensive. The
Congressional Budget Office projects the FFCRA to cost the federal
government about $192 billion over its (brief) operational period of nine
months (April to December 2020);99 the payroll tax credits alone
represent a tax expenditure of $105 billion.100 Although the Joint
Committee on Taxation (JCT) has not broken down the estimated tax
expenditure by types of leaves (e.g., how much emergency childcare
leaves cost compared to sick leaves), EPSLA subsidies likely represent a
substantial share of the $105 billion in expenditure: sick leaves, while
much shorter than family or school-closure leaves, are granted the highest
statutory cap of eligible wages and tax credits ($511 per day for up to ten
days).
There are two obvious countervailing observations here. We are in a
pandemic, which of course increases the number of aggregate sick times
taken by workers. In addition, if the positive externalities generated by a
paid-sick-leave mandate are sufficiently large, workers may end up
taking not only fewer days off work in general but also fewer sick days,
due to a general improvement in public health, thus reducing the costs of
any potential subsidies.101 When the COVID-19 pandemic subsides,
some may argue, the cost of subsidizing a paid-sick-leave mandate, à la
FFCRA, will become lower.
Although these two observations certainly suggest that the COVID-19
pandemic is contributing to the excessive cost of the current regime, it is
unlikely that any fully subsidized paid-sick-leave mandate—
implemented in similar ways as the FFCRA—will cost anything less than
tens of billions of dollars each year. The FFCRA only subsidizes COVID19-related paid-sick-leave wages, so the JCT’s estimate of $105 billion

98. See National Compensation Survey, supra note 9, at 120 (noting that only 64% of employees
who work for small employers (those with 1–49 employees) have access to paid sick leave, versus
91% of employees who work for large employers (those with more than 500 employees)).
99. See Letter from Phillip L. Swagel, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Nita M. Lowey, Chairwoman of the Comm. on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-04/HR6201.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ88-HDC8] (stating
that the FFCRA will increase the deficit by $192 billion over ten years, with most of that being
fiscal years 2020 (ending on September 30, 2020) and 2021).
100. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, FFCRA ESTIMATES, supra note 21 (stating that the
tax credits for paid sick and paid family and medical leave expiring at the end of 2020 will cost
about $105 million).
101. See Stearns & White, supra note 42, at 240 (concluding that paid sick leave mandates may
reduce the overall number of sick days taken and provide public health benefits that could exceed
the costs imposed on employers).
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for providing the payroll tax credits for nine months does not take into
account any other type of sickness that necessitates an employee’s taking
time off work. The seasonal flu, for example, affects about ten to fifty
million Americans each year,102 many more than COVID-19 has thus far
in 2020. Further, while a paid-sick-leave mandate stands to generate
positive externalities and improvement in public health, illnesses will
never completely go away: a very optimistic study found an 18%
reduction in aggregate illness-related work absences as a result of
Connecticut’s paid-sick-leave mandate,103 so even with mandated paid
sick leaves, a substantial majority of current sick leaves will remain.
Should Congress extend FFCRA to cover future years and all illnesses,
therefore, the subsidized mandate will likely become one of the most
expensive items in the tax expenditure budget, on par with the
government subsidies for employer-provided health insurance or
retirement plans.104
The source of the FFCRA funding is as concerning as its magnitude.
As previously described, the subsidy takes the form of a refundable tax
credit against the employer-collected portion of the Social Security
Tax,105 which is collected from both the employer and the employee at a
rate of 6.2% each (12.4% total), on the first $137,700 of wage income of
the employee.106 Importantly, the Social Security Tax, as its name

102. Frequently Asked Questions about Estimated Flu Burden, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
&
PREVENTION
(Oct.
14,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/burden/faq.htm
[https://perma.cc/96Q2-ZJ8X] (“CDC estimates that flu has resulted in between 9.3 million and 45
million illnesses each year in the United States since 2010.”).
103. See Stearns & White, supra note 42, at 234.
104. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR
FISCAL YEARS 2019–2023, at 28–29 (2019) [hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION,
EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES] (estimating that between 2019 and 2023 $933 billion will be spent on
tax expenditures for employer-provided health insurance and over $1.3 trillion will be spent on
employer retirement benefits and contribution plans).
105. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
106. I.R.C. § 3111 (imposing 6.2% tax on employers); I.R.C. § 3101 (imposing 6.2% tax on
employees); Press Release, Soc. Sec. Admin,, Social Security Announces 1.6 Percent Benefit Increase for 2020 (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/releases/2019/ (stating that the
maximum amount of earnings subject to the Social Security tax will increase to $137,700 for 2020).
Although half of the tax is paid by the employer, the economic incidence of the tax is a subject of
scholarly debate. The traditionally accepted view is that the employee bears the economic burden
of the tax. One recent study, however, found that employers may bear at least a substantial part of
the economic burden of payroll taxation. Compare, e.g., Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax
Incidence, in 4 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1789 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein
eds., 2002) (“The standard view of the economic burden of the payroll tax in the United States is
that it is borne entirely by employees.”), with Emmanuel Saez et al., Payroll Taxes, Firm Behavior,
and Rent Sharing: Evidence from a Young Workers’ Tax Cut in Sweden, 109 AM. ECON. REV.
1717, 1717–18 (2019) (offering some evidence that firms and employers may bear part of the payroll-tax burden).
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suggests, funds the Social Security program,107 which provides basic
incomes to workers and their family members as the workers age, become
disabled, and die. Social Security is underfunded. Some of the program’s
trust funds are projected to deplete by 2023, and the current program,
considered as a whole, will remain solvent only until 2034, after which
point the Administration can only afford to pay about 77% of the
scheduled benefits.108 Maintaining solvency after 2034 requires either a
substantial reduction in promised benefits or a 3.58 percentage point
increase in payroll tax.109 A permanent paid-sick-leave mandate
subsidized by payroll tax credits would exacerbate existing deficiencies
in the Social Security program.
Of course, the federal government has used payroll tax funding to
support a variety of other economic and social policies in the past.
Prominent examples include payroll tax cuts or credits for the purpose of
stimulating the economy or the labor market during a short-term
recession.110 For example, the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 temporarily reduced the
employee-side Social Security Tax rate from 6.2% to 4.2%.111 Earlier on,
the Carter administration implemented a (much-criticized and shortlived) payroll tax credit to encourage businesses to hire additional
workers and reduce unemployment.112 More recently, under § 41(h) of
the tax code, eligible small businesses may claim a portion of their
research and development expenses as credits against their Social
Security Tax liability, but the maximum allowed payroll tax credit
amount is $250,000.113 In any event, when the federal government has
reduced payroll tax burdens through a rate cut or provision of tax credits,
107. About 89% of social security funding comes from payroll taxation. See How Is Social
Security Financed?, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/factsheets/HowAreSocialSecurity.htm [https://perma.cc/4G46-DNMN] (last visited Nov. 15, 2020).
108. H.R. DOC. NO. 114-145, at 2–6 (2016).
109. Id. at 5–6.
110. Payroll tax cuts and credits have been highly popular mechanisms to spur economic
growth, likely because they are perceived as distributively justified—lower-income households
bear disproportionate burdens for taxes on wage income—and cost-effective, even though welltargeted direct spending programs are likely more successful. See MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & DONALD
J. MARPLES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IN11159, PAYROLL TAX CUTS AS ECONOMIC STIMULUS: PAST
EXPERIENCE AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 2 (2019).
111. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 601, 124 Stat. 3296, 3309 (reducing the employee payroll tax to 4.2% for a
“payroll tax holiday period” of calendar year 2011).
112. See Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 202, 91 Stat. 126,
141–42 (reducing payroll taxes); see also Leonard E. Burman, New Jobs Tax Credit (From the
Archives), TAX POL’Y CTR. (Jan. 8, 2009), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/new-jobs-taxcredit-archives [https://perma.cc/HZ8J-JNH5] (explaining the slight impact of the credit in stimulating employment).
113. I.R.C. § 41(h).
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the modification to the funding structure of Social Security is either
temporary (e.g., to stimulate the economy during a downturn) or heavily
limited (e.g., by instituting a statutory cap on the amount of credit that the
taxpayer can claim). The current wave of legislation does not deviate
from this pattern: the FFCRA payroll tax credits are set to expire by the
end of this calendar year, and the CARES Act (Coronavirus Aid, Relief,
and Economic Security Act) provides only for the deferral (rather than
the elimination) of payroll tax liability, with a temporary employee
retention credit that, again, is set to expire by the end of this calendar
year.114 These legislative patterns reflect a deeper underlying concern
that uncoupling payroll taxes from the Social Security program risks
weakening the unique relationship between revenue and expenditure
inherent in payroll taxes, which might eventually lead to destabilizing the
funding for a social safety net. Given these considerations, FFCRA’s
provision of Social Security Tax credits is not a viable way of subsidizing
paid sick leaves in the long run.
Mandating employers to provide benefits to employees often raises
issues of incidence, but they are attenuated in the case of the FFCRA
because the government is fully subsidizing the paid leaves. I briefly
address some of these issues here because they arise in the Article’s
subsequent discussion about alternative models of funding. In the case of
paid sick leaves, there are two main types of costs: the direct costs of
providing replacement wages to the employees while they are on leave
and the indirect costs associated with implementing the government
mandate. These indirect costs may include finding substitutes for onleave workers, enforcing the anti-retaliation provisions, and keeping
track of which employees have taken how many weeks of leave. For
example, an employer may have to keep more employees on its payroll
than the work requires to account for anticipated sick leaves and hire
compliance officials to exercise oversight over potential retaliation
claims. The Department of Labor’s regulations implementing the FFCRA
contain a breakeven analysis that estimates the magnitude of select
indirect costs, including those incurred by employers in rule
familiarization, documentation, and posting notices, which total roughly
$553 million.115 This estimate does not include the costs incurred by
employers in finding substitutes for on-leave workers, which are likely
even more substantial compared to notice or compliance costs given that
a company’s daily operation often depends on the employee’s scheduled

114. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, §§ 2301–2302,
134 Stat. 281, 347–52 (2020).
115. See Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 19,326,
19,344–45 (Apr. 6, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 826).
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attendance at work. These business-disruption costs may be larger for
paid sick leaves in comparison with paid family or medical leaves,
because short-term illnesses (such as catching a bad cold) are harder if
not impossible to predict and plan for, in comparison with pregnancy
(where the due date is communicated to the mother usually at least a few
months in advance, leaving time for planning) or serious illnesses (whose
treatments are often scheduled with some advance notice). In a
competitive labor market, employers will pass these costs onto the
employees by lowering wages,116 though in the context of emergency
legislation in the middle of a pandemic, passing on these costs may take
other forms or be delayed (e.g., employers may delay raising wages or
forgo granting promotions).
In any event, even if the costs are absorbed by the employees, there
will be efficiency gains overall as long as the objective benefits to the
employee (rather than the employee’s subjective valuation of them,
which may be distorted by cognitive biases) exceed the costs to the
employer. In other words, the joint welfare of employers and employees
is maximized when (and even if) employers pass the costs of providing
paid sick leaves—indirect costs, given FFCRA’s subsidies—onto the
employees. The problem arises where the employer cannot pass the costs
onto the employees,117 for example, due to wage rigidities introduced by
minimum-wage regulations. That is, for low-income workers whose
wages are set at or immediately above the minimum wage level,
mandating paid sick leaves may result in their unemployment.118 For
purposes of the FFCRA, this concern is attenuated because the federal
government is funding 100% of the on-leave wages (which constitute a
majority of the total costs of the mandate). But this observation
underscores the need for at least some federal subsidies for low-income

116. Leading studies have found that employers pass close to 100% of the costs associated with
providing certain employee benefits to the workers in the form of lower wages. See, e.g., Jonathan
Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 622, 623 (1994) (“The
findings consistently suggest shifting of the costs of the mandates [of comprehensively covering
childbirths in health insurance plans] on the order of 100 percent, with little effect on net labor
input.”); see also Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1471, 1506–08 (1998) (using the endowment effect, a type of loss aversion where people
are less willing to sell their entitlements than to buy entitlements that they do not possess, to explain
Gruber’s empirical findings).
117. See also Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 362 (1991) (arguing, in a consumerseller context, the seller’s inability to pass on the costs of a legal rule may harm, rather than benefit,
consumers).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 70–71 (explaining that minimum wage policies coupled with paid sick leave policies can have the side effect of harming low-income workers).
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workers if Congress enacts a permanent paid-sick-leave mandate.119 At
the same time, the concern with unemployment, while diminished, does
not completely vanish—the business-disruption costs themselves may
lead some employers to conclude against retaining minimum-wage
workers during a pandemic, since the government is not reimbursing any
of the indirect costs associated with paid sick leaves. This underscores
the need to direct at least some of the federal subsidies to employers,
rather than employees alone.120
An additional issue here is that the FFCRA does not cover the entire
American workforce: for private-sector employers, the statute only
applies to those with fewer than 500 employees.121 This limited coverage,
of course, was intended to target the mandate to workers with the least
access to paid sick leaves, since 91% of employees who work at large
firms with 500 or more employees already have access to some paid sick
leaves.122 But this means that about five million workers (9% of workers
employed by large firms) both lack access to paid sick leaves and do not
fall under the coverage of FFCRA.123 To be sure, many large employers
have voluntarily adopted emergency paid-sick-leave benefits for the
duration of the pandemic. But it is unlikely that those benefits will stay
in place after the pandemic subsides. Even right now, those employers
with emergency paid-sick-leave benefits related to COVID-19 have
designed their policies in such a way as to discourage workers from
taking advantage of them.124 Moving forward, a national mandate of paid
sick leaves should not exclude part of the workforce, though a wide
statutory coverage also accentuates the problem of cost: government
subsidies for paid sick leaves will have to be limited in some way, as the
current regime is highly costly even without including a large portion of
the workforce in its coverage.

119. Of course, the other approach is to eliminate wage rigidities by repealing minimum-wage
laws. This is impractical and will also require the (unlikely) coordination of state and local governments in repealing their minimum-wage regulations.
120. See infra Section III.D (proposing that a federal mandate of paid sick leaves at least partially reimburses employers for indirect costs).
121. FFCRA § 5110(2), 134 Stat. at 199.
122. See National Compensation Survey, supra note 9, at 120 tbl.31.
123. See Distribution of Private Sector Employment by Firm Size Class, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB.
STAT., https://www.bls.gov/web/cewbd/table_f.txt [https://perma.cc/38ME-BC9G] (showing that
8.657 million and 51.074 million individuals are employed at firms with between 500 and 999
employees and 1,000 or more employees, respectively).
124. It has been reported, for example, that under Amazon’s emergency paid-sick-leave policy,
workers will not be paid until they return to work after their coronavirus-related quarantine—a
feature that clearly has the effect of deterring some workers from taking the sick leaves. See Olga
Khazan, Amazon Is Struggling to Pay Workers in Quarantine, ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/03/does-walmart-provide-paid-sickleave/608779/ [https://perma.cc/H33Y-MHK9].
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A related concern with the FFCRA is that the provision of tax credits
is overinclusive. Approximately 70% of the employees falling under the
statutory coverage already have access to paid sick leaves of some sort
prior to the pandemic. Of course, the FFCRA has increased the amount
of benefit for many—five to nine days are generally the norm for paid
sick leaves, and most state and local initiatives provide for the maximum
accrual of forty hours of paid leaves within a calendar year,125 rather than
the two work weeks (eighty hours) provided by the FFCRA.126 But for
many employers, the FFCRA payroll tax credits represent a windfall:
they would have provided the paid sick leaves anyway (and indeed did
provide them), perhaps because their employees took steps to address
their cognitive biases and information failures and more accurately
assessed the values of paid sick leaves. For those employers, government
subsidies for a permanent paid-sick-leave mandate may not be necessary,
as long as unemployment concerns are not triggered and there is
sufficient political will to mandate paid sick leaves.
III. DESIGNING A PERMANENT PAID-SICK-LEAVE MANDATE
This Part of the Article examines alternative methods of effectuating a
national paid-sick-leave policy and suggests designing a refundable tax
credit to the employer, whose amount varies with the wage income of the
employee, to subsidize a national paid-sick-leave mandate. The first
Section briefly summarizes previous models of funding. The remainder
of this Part discusses three main institutional-design issues that are
relevant to a permanent subsidy of paid sick leaves: financing (through
the payroll tax or general revenue), implementation (through socialinsurance programs or employer mandates), and distribution (with
respect to determining the appropriate subsidy and wage-replacement
levels).
A. Existing (Scholarly and Legislative) Models
This Section briefly examines three separate models for funding a
national policy of paid sick leaves that have been proposed by scholars
(for the purpose of funding paid family leaves rather than paid sick
leaves—but still helpful to our discussions) or enacted into the tax code.
The first model, developed in 1994 in the wake of FMLA’s enactment,
involves imposing payroll taxes to pool together a general fund to

125. See Hultin & Follet, supra note 7 (showing that at least eight states use the 40-hour maximum).
126. See National Compensation Survey, supra note 9, at 131 tbl.34 (showing that 46% of all
workers with access to paid sick leaves receive a benefit period of five to nine days).
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subsidize maternity leaves.127 Professor Issacharoff (together with his coauthor) argues that women of childbearing age are deterred from laborforce participation not because of invidious discrimination but
insufficient accommodation of the needs of pregnancy; the two scholars
then develop an insurance model that involves financing from an
additional payroll tax (that he estimates will be substantially lower than
2.4% and requires overcoming less political headwind), payout as a
percentage of pre-leave earnings for a fixed term (twelve weeks), and
anti-abuse measures such as a minimum eligibility period before
conception.128 In particular, this model suggests splitting the payout
between employers and employees. Part of the fund’s benefits (between
15% and 40%) will not be wage replacement but will be paid to
employers to cover their costs in finding temporary substitutes for onleave employees—the percentage paid to employers is positively
correlated to the specialization of the employee’s job (and therefore the
wage income of the employee). This structure is intended to cover the
increased costs of replacing highly specialized workers to employers and
to recognize that more highly compensated employees likely have
independent financial resources on which to rely during pregnancy.129 In
short, this model chooses payroll tax funding, pre-set schedules of
benefits, and some kind of social-insurance administration to distribute
the benefits.
The second model departs from the first in focusing on state
unemployment insurance programs as a starting point for implementing
reforms (again, for paid family rather than sick leaves).130 Contending
that women’s increased participation in the labor force will promote the
broader societal value of gender equality, Professor Lester provides a
normative basis for subsidizing paid family leaves through general
revenue rather than payroll taxation, which is imposed on wage income
only. Her conclusion, however, represents a compromise and draws
funding from payroll tax (imposed on workers to create buy-in—
employee-collected payroll tax strengthens the impression that workers
themselves are paying for their own benefits) supplemented by sources
127. See Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating
the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2158–59, 2216 (1994).
128. Id. at 2216–18.
129. Id. at 2218–20.
130. See Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 66 (2005).
The focus on state rather than federal instrumentalities for implementing and subsidizing paid family leaves is in part due to the political environment of the mid-2000s: given the Bush presidency’s
hostility against the Clinton administration’s policies on paid family leave (e.g., the Birth and
Adoption Unemployment Compensation regulation, which allowed states to provide wage replacement for parents following the birth or adoption of children), “legislation providing for paid family
leave is most likely to happen at the state level,” according to Professor Lester. Id.
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of general revenue.131 Observing that high-income employees tend to
take leaves even if unpaid, Professor Lester proceeds to design a model
that would “more assuredly . . . reach workers of middle and lower
incomes,” recommending a payout amount as a percentage of regular
wages but with a benefit floor and ceiling—akin to unemploymentinsurance programs.132 In order to minimize frivolous leave-taking and,
at the same time, allow the employee to continue her normal standard of
living, she suggests setting the replacement wage level at 70%.133 In
short, this model chooses a combination of payroll tax and general
revenue funding, pre-set schedules of benefits, and state unemployment
agencies to distribute the benefits.
A third model of effectuating a paid-sick-leave policy, which is very
much on the table as a legislative possibility, is found in § 45S of the tax
code, enacted as part of the 2017 tax legislation—commonly known as
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA).134 This section provides a general
business tax credit to incentivize employers’ voluntary adoptions of paidleave policies. Very little scholarly attention has been devoted to § 45S,
primarily because it was a temporary measure set to expire in 2019.135
But Congress has shown willingness to extend § 45S, which will remain
in effect until at least the end of 2020, and may extend it further after
2020.136 As a threshold issue, it is important to note that, while some
commentators initially expected § 45S to apply to paid sick leaves as well
as paid family and medical leaves, the IRS’s subsequent regulations
implementing the statute clarified that § 45S would only apply to the
latter at this time.137 But with the COVID-19 outbreak and the continuing
need for employees to stay away from their physical workplaces,138 it is
131. Id. at 73–74.
132. Id. at 75.
133. Id.
134. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 [hereinafter TCJA]
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
135. The only academic analyses of § 45S are found in accounting scholarship and focus on
explaining the statute and how to calculate the credit, instead of any systematic assessment of policy. See, e.g., Matthew Geiszler & John McKinley, New Tax Credit for Paid Family and Medical
Leave, 226 J. ACCT. 20, 21–21 (2018); Sidney Kess, First Look at the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017, 88 CPA J. 6, 8 (2018).
136. See I.R.C. § 45S(i).
137. See I.R.S. Notice 2018-71, 2018-41 I.R.B. 548 [hereinafter Notice 2018-71],
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-18-71.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7FE-UGTY] (stating that the
§ 45S credit applies “only if the leave is specifically designated for one or more FMLA purposes,
may not be used for any other reason, and is not paid by a State or local government or required by
State or local law”).
138. Google, for example, recently announced that its employees may work from home until
July 2021. See Google Extends Work from Home Through June Next Year, REUTERS (July 27,
2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-alphabet-google/google-extendswork-from-home-through-june-next-year-idUSKCN24S1M8 [https://perma.cc/5E4T-9UQY].
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not unlikely that Congress will consider designing a permanent paid-sickleave policy as a parallel to (and based on the model of) § 45S. The
remainder of this Section describes the mechanics of this provision.
Section 45S is a nudge rather than shove: instead of mandating
provision of paid leaves, it grants a general business credit, ranging from
12.5% to 25% of the family and medical leave wages actually paid by the
employer to the employee, that reduces dollar-for-dollar the employer’s
tax liability.139 In order to qualify for the credit, employers must institute
a written policy that provides at least two weeks of annual paid family
and medical leave for all covered full-time employees,140 as well as an
amount of paid leave for covered part-time employees that corresponds
to their working hours as a percentage of full-time employees’ working
hours.141 The written policy must, in addition, contain an anti-retaliation
provision that prevents the employer from interfering with employees’
exercises of rights under the policy.142 The amount of tax credit correlates
with the generosity of the paid leave policy: employers must, at a
minimum, pay their on-leave employees at least 50% of their regular
wages—and this minimum provision of 50% of regular wages is
subsidized by a credit equal to 12.5% of the actual family and medical
leave wages paid to the employee. Each additional percentage of the
employee’s regular wages that the employer’s paid-leave policy provides
(i.e., beyond the minimum 50% of regular wages) will then entitle the
employer to a 0.25% increase in the tax credit, up to a maximum of 25%
of total family and medical leave wages, which the employer receives
when it pays its on-leave employees 100% of their regular wages.143

139. See I.R.C. § 45S(a)(2). Although the general business credit is nonrefundable, it can be
carried back to offset the taxpayer’s liability from the previous tax year and carried forward to
offset the taxpayer’s potential liabilities in future tax years.
140. For purposes of § 45S, an eligible employee is defined as someone employed by the employer for at least one year and not excessively compensated (i.e., the employee’s salary does not
exceed 60% of the salary of a highly compensated individual, as defined by § 414(q)—this threshold currently stands at around $75,000 per year). See id. § 45S(d); see also Notice 2018-71, supra
note 137, at 2 (“[Qualified employees] must not have had compensation from the employer of more
than $72,000 in 2017.”).
141. For example, if a full-time employee is expected to work for the employer for 40 hours per
week and a part-time employee 20 hours (50% of the full workload), then the employer must provide at least one week (50%) of annual family and medical leave to the part-time employee.
142. See I.R.C. § 45S(c)(2)(A) (stating that employer’s medical leave policy must contain a
clause that the employer will not interfere with “any right provided under the policy”).
143. See id. § 45S(a)(2).
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There is no additional federal tax incentive for replacing over 100% of
the employees’ regular wages when they are on sick leave. The following
figure illustrates § 45S’s scheme:

In short, § 45S chooses general revenue financing, no pre-set schedule
of benefits besides a minimum floor of 50% wage replacement rate, and
tax institutions for distributing a subsidy to employers, who will
independently pay their employees.
B. Financing: Payroll Taxation or General Revenue?
One recurring issue in designing a subsidized paid-leave policy
concerns the source of funding: on the federal level, the choice is
generally between payroll taxation or general revenue.144 Payroll taxes
144. Unlike the state governments, the federal government does not have plenary power to tax:
the Sixteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to tax “income,” but certain other taxes, such as
taxes on personal property or the much-debated proposed tax on wealth, may fall under the Direct
Tax Clause and have to be apportioned among the states by their population. See, e.g., Erik M.
Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 2334 (1997) (arguing that some consumption taxes violate constitutional norms);
Alex Zhang, The Wealth Tax: Apportionment, Federalism, and Constitutionality, 23 U. PA. J.L. &
SOC. CHANGE 269 (2020). See also U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (allowing Congress to levy an income
tax); U.S. CONST. art. I § 2, cl. 3 (requiring that direct taxes imposed by the national government
be apportioned among the states on the basis of population). State funding can come from a more
diverse variety of sources: property, sales (consumption), and income taxes are all possibilities. But
in reality, state funding for social welfare and insurance programs is limited because of interstate
competition, which constrains the rise of taxes, and inadequate borrowing capacity. Scholars have
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are imposed on wage income only and take three forms: the Social
Security Tax (which is collected from both the employer and the
employee at a rate of 6.2% each), the Medicare Tax (which is collected
from both the employer and the employee at a rate of 1.45% each), and
unemployment taxes (which are generally collected from the employer
only at varying rates depending on the state). Taken together, payroll
taxes constitute about 37% of federal tax revenue145 and fund distinct
spending programs: the Social Security Tax funds the Social Security
program, the Medicare Tax funds Part A of the Medicare program, and
the unemployment taxes fund unemployment benefits. In contrast,
income taxes—which constitute the largest source of federal
revenue146—are not designated for any particular spending. Despite some
notable deviations (i.e., tax expenditures147), income taxes are imposed
on accretions to economic well-being over a period of time,
conceptualized as the sum of consumption and savings and encoded in
§ 61’s broad definition of income.148
Because payroll tax is imposed only on wage earnings and income
taxes on a much more comprehensive tax base, the choice between
payroll-tax funding or general-revenue (principally income-tax) funding
reflects a more fundamental policy judgment whether to spread the costs
of paid sick leaves among workers only or across a broad swath of
society. As a threshold matter, it is also worthwhile to note that mandated
benefits do not produce as much deadweight loss (and inefficient
distortions in the labor market) as public provision of (the same) benefits

previously argued that countries are also under pressure, in an increasingly globalized world, to use
tax incentives to attract and compete for international investment, thus constraining the national
governments’ abilities to support social welfare programs. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000)
(explaining how corporations seeking the most favorable tax treatment abroad harms the welfare
state at home). But because interjurisdictional competition exerts a lower fiscal pressure on national
compared to state governments—it is still much easier to move businesses across state borders than
national boundaries, even if globalization has made outsourcing more feasible—federal funding of
paid sick leaves is much more realistic than state funding. Tellingly, none of the states that have
enacted mandates allowing employees to accrue paid sick leaves subsidize replacement wages. The
2017 legislation’s cap on the state and local tax deduction further constrains the ability of state and
local governments to tax and spend. See Alex Zhang, The State and Local Tax Deduction and Fiscal
Federalism, 168 TAX NOTES 2429 (2020).
145. See Taxes, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.cbo.gov/topics/taxes
[https://perma.cc/2VQ5-WBVM] (estimating that $1.3 trillion will be collected in payroll taxes for
fiscal year 2020).
146. Individual and corporate income taxes constitute about 51% of federal revenue. See id.
(projecting $1.5 trillion in individual income taxes and $151 billion in corporate income taxes).
147. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
148. See I.R.C. § 61 (defining gross income as “all income from whatever source derived”).
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through payroll taxation,149 so there is an efficiency-based argument for
employer provision of paid sick leaves rather than a social-insurance
implementation. The remainder of this Section argues that there are good
normative, practical, and distributive reasons to fund a paid-sick-leave
mandate through general revenues.150
First, the large, positive externalities created by a paid-sick-leave
mandate help justify general-revenue funding. As already described, in
the case of funding paid family leaves, Professor Lester argued that
women’s increased participation in the workforce advances broader
societal values of gender equality, which in turn provides an ethical
foundation for general-revenue funding of paid family leaves.151 In the
case of paid sick leaves, an employer mandate brings benefits that
similarly promote broader societal goals beyond worker welfare.
Improvements in public health and advancement in distributive goals
(e.g., workplace equality), for example, may have positive spillover
effects on communities with no wage income.152 When employees,
particularly those in the service sectors, can afford to stay at home while
exhibiting symptoms of infectious diseases, all members of society—
whether they earn wage income or not—benefit because they incur a
smaller likelihood of catching an illness through contact in public spaces.
The most poignant illustration can be found in COVID-19’s impact on
nursing homes, where the coronavirus killed countless numbers of
workers and elderly residents, the latter of whom are unlikely to have
wage income but will immensely benefit from a paid-sick-leave policy
for their caregivers.153 These positive externality effects provide a
149. See Lawrence H. Summers, supra note 20, at 180 (arguing that free negotiation for compensation allows for mutually efficient outcomes).
150. It is worth emphasizing that payroll taxes are not an undifferentiated whole but compose
of distinct revenue streams that fund distinct parts of our social safety net. While Section II.B has
shown that the Social Security Tax cannot sustainably provide funding for a mandate of paid sick
leaves, see supra text accompanying notes 105–114, an intriguing proposal would draw funding
from the Medicare Tax, which funds medical care for the elderly. This intuition is grounded in an
innovative study on the 1918 Influenza Pandemic, which shows that pandemics can have lasting
health effects on infected populations sixty-five to eighty years after the initial infections. See
Douglas Almond & Bhashkar Mazumder, The 1918 Influenza Pandemic and Subsequent Health
Outcomes: An Analysis of SIPP Data, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 258 (2005). Because provision of paid
sick leaves reduces current infection rates, it also lightens the future fiscal burden on the Medicare
program as fewer people suffer from the long-term health consequences associated with the pandemic virus, thus justifying Medicare Tax funding of a paid-sick-leave mandate. This thought is
worth exploring but subject to the flaw that we cannot know, ex ante, which pandemic virus will
result in lasting health effects—the seasonal flu certainly does not.
151. See Lester, supra note 130, at 73–74 (emphasizing that there are multiple ethical justifications for spreading the costs of paid family leave beyond leave-takers).
152. See also supra Sections I.B, I.C.
153. See Karen Yourish et al., One-Third of All U.S. Coronavirus Deaths Are Nursing Home
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normative basis for spreading the costs of paid sick leaves across society
at large, through the mechanism of, for example, an income tax credit.154
It is also noteworthy that general-revenue funding does not imply that
workers will not contribute to the costs. Wage income represents the
largest source of personal income in the United States (and therefore one
of the largest sources of general federal revenue). General-revenue
funding, therefore, simply means that the costs will be shared between
labor and those with no wage income but other forms of income, not that
labor is off the hook.155
Second, the rationales behind proposals of payroll-tax funding have
lost some of their persuasive power given changes in the political
environment. Scholars and policymakers have chosen payroll taxes to
fund possible expansion in social-insurance programs primarily for
political reasons: Professor Issacharoff, for example, has rejected
general-revenue funding of paid pregnancy leaves because the legislative
history of the FMLA “suggests the enormous political difficulties in using
general revenues for expanded social benefits programs.”156 Professor
Lester similarly suggests imposing some additional payroll tax on
workers to create “stronger political appeal and facilitate buy-in by the
public and pro-business legislators.”157 Beyond inertia in initial
legislative enactment, general-revenue funding of social benefits has also
been criticized for fiscal instability: in times of budget tightening, they
might be the first on the chopping block. Given the COVID-19 pandemic,
however, there is much political will (and indeed, pressure) to institute a
federal policy on paid sick leaves, even if they involve general-revenue
subsidies from the federal government. The enactment of § 45S, which
uses a general-revenue funding mechanism and provides business tax
credits, itself shows that the political difficulties are not impossible to
overcome. In addition, the stigma associated with general-revenue
funding of expanded social benefits, which might deter pro-business

Residents or Workers (May 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/05/09/us/coronavirus-cases-nursing-homes-us.html [https://perma.cc/Y78N-LHK2] (estimating that at least
46,400 nursing home residents and nurses had died from the coronavirus by mid-May 2020).
154. Of course, this argument also applies to other social-insurance programs that may have
large positive externalities. For example, if having an adequate social safety net for unemployment
and disability is found to benefit society at large in addition to workers, then there might be an
argument to fund those programs through general revenue rather than payroll taxation. A more
detailed discussion of this issue, however, belongs to another project.
155. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Individual Income Tax Returns, 2017, in INDIVIDUAL INCOME
TAX RETURNS 2017: PUBLICATION 1304 19, 19 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/17inintaxreturns.pdf [https://perma.cc/V63R-4A8A] (“Salaries and wages, the largest component of total
income (67.8 percent in 2017) . . . .”).
156. Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 127, at 2215.
157. Lester, supra note 130, at 73.
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legislators from extending their support, is most pronounced when the
government spends money to promote social welfare. When the
government implements a measure through a reduction in revenue rather
than an increase in spending (especially by providing a tax credit to
businesses), the optics are very different, even if the economic substance
is the same.
More importantly, payroll-tax funding involves fixed revenue streams
that cannot accommodate the fiscal needs of a paid-sick-leave mandate.
In general, payroll taxes are imposed at a fixed rate, determined at the
time of their creation, which cannot be changed without subsequent
legislative actions. Therefore, payroll taxes are best for financing
spending programs whose expenditures can be predicted in advance:
retirement benefits and paid maternity leaves are good examples—it is
unlikely that the number of retirements or pregnancies among workers
will drastically change from year to year.158 Sick leaves are completely
different: a pandemic, or even annual variations in the spread of the
seasonal flu,159 can trigger wide cyclical variations in the number of
leaves taken and in the required funding levels that are impossible to
predict in advance. In theory, of course, Congress can set the tax rate at a
substantially higher level than needed during a regular year and save the
excess for funding sick leaves during pandemics—but in practice the
annual budgetary surplus in those social welfare programs will inevitably
be attacked as unnecessary taxation. Unemployment, of course, is
cyclical, and in the context of the current COVID-19 pandemic, payrolltax funding of unemployment benefits has shown its disadvantage: by
early April 2020, many states’ unemployment trust funds only had the
capacity of funding a few weeks of total projected benefits.160
Third, distributive reasons counsel against funding paid sick leaves
through payroll taxation. Federal payroll taxes are highly regressive:
while income taxes are imposed at progressive rates with no cap on the
amount taxed, payroll taxes are imposed at usually fixed rates with a

158. The average number of maternity leaves taken in the United States, for example, have
remained very stable between 1994 and 2015, varying between a low of 237,761 per month in 2011
and 299,861 per month in 2015, and the number of maternity leaves taken per 10,000 births has
essentially remained the same. See Jay L. Zagorsky, Divergent Trends in US Maternity and Paternity Leave, 1994–2015, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 460, 461 tbl.1 (2017).
159. See Frequently Asked Questions About Estimated Flu Burden, supra note 102 (showing
that the seasonal flu affects anywhere between 10 and 50 million Americans each year—an exceedingly wide range).
160. See Jared Waczak, States’ Unemployment Compensation Trust Funds Could Run Out in
Mere Weeks, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://taxfoundation.org/state-unemployment-compensation-trust-funds-run-mere-weeks [https://perma.cc/B42D-ZDMU] (outlining the results of a 2020
survey about how many weeks of unemployment benefits state trust funds can cover).
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defined cap on total amount taxed.161 The Social Security Tax, for
example, is collected at 6.2% each from employers and employees on
only the first $137,700 of the employee’s annual salary; any wage earning
beyond the cap is untaxed.162 For these reasons, payroll-tax burdens,
measured as a percentage of one’s income, correlate inversely with one’s
total income level: the Joint Committee on Taxation estimates the average
payroll tax rate for Americans in the lowest income group (with an
adjusted gross income of less than $10,000) at 11.8%, and, for Americans
in the highest income group (with an adjusted gross income of more than
$1 million), at 1.9%.163 Funding a paid-sick-leave mandate from payroll
taxes might therefore result in distributive injustices (assuming that we
do not want lower-income workers to contribute proportionally more to
the provision of benefits), even if we adopt Professor Lester’s call for a
high cap on amount taxed.164 Using general-revenue funding, on the other
hand, does not carry this disadvantage: making up the lost revenue
incurred by business or individual income tax credits would
automatically involve the income tax system, which has progressive
rates.165
C. Choice of Institutions
Another fundamental choice concerns institutions: should we
implement paid sick leaves as a government-administered socialinsurance program, an employer mandate with tax subsidies, or an
incentive policy without a mandate? As previous discussions and the title
of the Article already suggest, my conclusion is that an employer mandate
represents the best option, and this Section explains why by examining
the disadvantages associated with institutional mechanisms previously
considered attractive.
One of the most apparent apparatuses to administer paid sick leaves is
through
a
social-insurance
program.
Previous
academic
recommendations for implementing paid pregnancy and family leaves—

161. Research has shown that unemployment taxes are similarly regressive. See Patricia M.
Anderson & Bruce D. Meyer, Unemployment Insurance Tax Burdens and Benefits: Funding
Family Leave and Reforming the Payroll Tax, 16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 10043, 2003).
162. I.R.C. § 3111.
163. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN
EFFECT FOR 2019, at 34 tbl.A-6 (Mar. 20, 2019) (showing the distribution of income and taxes and
projected average tax rates).
164. See Lester, supra note 130, at 74 (“There should also be a relatively high ceiling on the
taxable wage base, closer to what we see for Social Security than for UI, to avoid regressivity.”).
165. Previous scholarship also notes the distributive pitfalls of using payroll taxes to expand
social welfare programs. E.g., Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution,
49 UCLA L. REV. 335, 381 (2001).
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as well as most collectively funded employee benefits in the United States
(e.g., unemployment and social security benefits)—center on these
institutions. But there are at least two significant disadvantages to paying
employees sick-leave wages through (state or federal) government
agencies. First, this approach would involve substantial administrative
costs to the government and bureaucracy-related costs to the employee
claimants, the latter of which may become so high that workers are
disincentivized from taking any paid sick leaves. As already explained in
the Introduction, this Article concerns sick leaves, which are
distinguished from family or medical leaves by their short duration and
the compromised health condition of the on-leave employee.166 The
monetary benefits associated with taking sick leaves (usually a few days’
worth of wages), therefore, are much smaller than those associated with
taking medical or family leaves (usually at least a month’s worth of
wages) or receiving unemployment benefits (where the uncertainty
surrounding the length of job loss itself may motivate workers to go
through the filing process). In order to file claims with social-insurance
programs, workers often must go through a fairly complex procedure
with an unfamiliar government office. Given the small size of benefits,
high costs of application, and their illness, workers may simply decide to
forgo taking a paid sick leave. In a pandemic, of course, social-insurance
agencies that administer the paid sick leaves may also become
overwhelmed. Second, government administration of employee benefits
also runs the risk of excessive rigidity.167 Social insurance generally
involves pre-set benefit schedules and gives employers little room to
tailor policies to the needs of their employees. For these reasons, most
countries have implemented paid sick leaves through employer
sponsorship rather than social insurance.168
Another possibility is to incentivize employers to adopt voluntarily
paid-sick-leave policies rather than mandating them, and this is precisely
the route chosen by the TCJA with regard to paid family and medical
leaves. In comparison with social insurance, this approach has the
advantage of avoiding substantial administrative costs to the government,
preserving employer flexibility in designing their benefit plans, and

166. See supra text accompanying notes 24–26.
167. See Lawrence H. Summers, supra note 20, at 179–80.
168. See Jody Heymann et al., Contagion Nation: A Comparison of Paid Sick Day Policies in
22 Countries, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES. 6 tbl.1 (May 2009), https://cepr.net/documents/publications/paid-sick-days-2009-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3NH-TWQC] (showing that, out of the
nineteen countries surveyed with paid sick leaves, fourteen implement the policy through employer
sponsorship, three through social insurance, and two through a combination of both). In comparison, more countries use either social insurance or a combination of social insurance and employer
sponsorship to implement paid medical leaves. See id. at 5.
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reducing at least some of the bureaucracy-related costs to the employee.
On the other hand, this approach carries the significant disadvantage that
not all employers will respond to the incentives, so some workers will
still be left without any access to paid sick leaves. Section 45S, for
example, certainly has not revolutionized the provision of paid family and
medical leaves in the United States. According to the Joint Committee on
Taxation, the federal government is projected to spend about $2.4 billion
on the tax credit for family and medical leaves in fiscal years 2019 and
2020.169 On the assumption that the average worker taking such leaves
makes a weekly wage of $949,170 § 45S subsidizes about five to ten
million weeks of family and medical leave in a given year (§ 45S does
not require employer’s paid-leave policy to be new or adopted in response
to TCJA, so even preexisting policies are entitled to the tax credits171).
While this certainly shows that some employers are taking advantage of
the § 45S tax credits, they do not go anywhere close to incentivizing a
majority of American employers to offer paid family and medical
leaves—if fully utilized at twelve weeks per birth, maternity leaves alone
would likely produce over ten million weeks of leave each year.172 In
order to strengthen the incentive effects, the federal government will have
to offer much more generous subsidies than the 12.5% to 25% tax credits
that § 45S currently provides, incurring costs as high as a fully subsidized
mandate.
In any event, if Congress decides to use § 45S as a model for enacting
a permanent paid-sick-leave policy, it should not adopt its federalism
penalty: § 45S denies the tax credit to the extent that the paid-leave policy
is paid by state or local authorities or required by state or local law.173
For example, if a state law requires the employer to provide two weeks
of paid leave with 100% wage replacement to all full-time employees,
then an employer who complies with all aspects of the statutory
requirement (e.g., by instituting a written policy providing nonretaliation
and two weeks of fully paid leave) will not be entitled to any § 45S credit.

169. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR
FISCAL YEARS 2019–2023, at 27 (2019).
170. See Economic News Release: Median Usual Weekly Earnings of Full-Time Wage and Salary Workers, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/wkyeng.t01.htm [https://perma.cc/AK27-WLY4] (showing the total median weekly earnings
of full-time wage and salary workers from 2011–2020).
171. See also Notice 2018-71, supra note 137 (stating that an employer’s “written leave policy
or an amendment to a policy (whether it is a new policy for the taxable year or an existing policy)
will be considered to be in place” if it complies with other requirements (emphasis added)).
172. See Zagorsky, supra note 158, at 461.
173. See I.R.C. § 45S(c)(4) (“For purposes of this section, any leave which is paid by a State or
local government or required by State or local law shall not be taken into account in determining
the amount of paid family and medical leave provided by the employer.”).
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It certainly makes sense to deny the tax credit when a state government
has funded the replacement wages (e.g., through a social-insurance
scheme), since the employer is not responsible for paying the on-leave
employees. But it makes little sense to deny the tax credit when a state
government has only required sick leaves to be paid, since the employer
is responsible for paying the on-leave employees. Importantly, concerns
with unemployment do not vanish just because state and local
governments have required employers to provide paid leaves. Requiring
employers to provide a certain benefit through state and local laws and
denying them a federal tax credit available to employers in other
jurisdictions (while the employer is unable to pass the costs onto
employees because of minimum-wage constraints) may heighten the risk
of under-compliance. Employers might encourage the development of a
workplace culture against taking the leaves (thus reducing their costs),
which could spill over even to companies where the leaves are
subsidized.174 The denial of tax credits would create horizontal inequity:
similarly situated employers will receive differential treatment in federal
subsidies solely by virtue of the policy variance of the states and localities
where they conduct business.175 Denying tax subsidies to employers in
jurisdictions that already have paid-sick-leave policies also punishes
states and localities that have recognized the value of those requirements
and deters other states from adopting similar policies in the future.
D. Subsidy Levels and Wage Replacement
The last set of features in our discussion concerns subsidy and wage
replacement levels: if the federal government institutes a paid-sick-leave
mandate and funds (at least part of) it by means of general revenue, how
(and how much) should it subsidize the mandate? This Section argues for
a substantial but incomplete wage replacement, together with a

174. Starbucks, for example, allegedly violated state and local paid-sick-leave mandates by requiring employees (referred to as “partners” by Starbucks) to find substitutes when they desired to
exercise paid-sick-leave entitlements under New York law. Failure to find replacement could result
in discipline and termination of employment. Starbucks settled the investigation after adopting a
nationwide policy of paid sick leaves. See Starbucks Corp., Assurance No. 19-155, 2–3 (Dec. 2019)
(assurance of discontinuance) (noting that Starbucks, in order to settle this lawsuit, agreed to adopt
a nationwide policy “designed to comply with all state and municipal leave policies applicable to
any location in the United States in which Starbucks stores are located, including New York
City . . . .”).
175. See also Letter from Ilyse Schuman, Senior Vice President, Health Policy, The American
Benefits Council to the Internal Revenue Service 3 (Nov. 19, 2018) (“[T]he Council believes that
the exclusion for employer-paid FML when mandated or paid for by a State or local government is
fundamentally unfair to employers. . . . We also think it raises serious federalism concerns for an
employer to be punished with higher federal taxes simply because the employer is located in a state
that requires the employer to provide a particular benefit that would generate a federal tax credit if
provided voluntarily.”).
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refundable business tax credit whose amount depends on the income of
the on-leave worker.
One threshold consideration here may lie in eligibility requirements:
Should the federal mandate immediately grant entitlements to paid sick
leaves, or should employees be required to accrue sick days by hours
worked? The latter method has been popular both in state and local
regulations and in proposed congressional legislation: the Healthy
Families Act of 2019 would have required employers to let employees
accrue paid sick leaves on the basis of their working hours, and all preCOVID-19 state legislations and ballot measures provide for the accrual
rather than an outright grant of entitlement to paid sick time.176
Traditional justifications for allowing employees to accrue paid times off
(including because of minor illnesses) are grounded in concerns of costs
and perceptions of desert. It may be especially costly for employers to
pay when new employees take time off, and because they have not
contributed to the business of the employer, they may be perceived as
somehow less deserving of a generous benefit—accrual, on the other
hand, makes it appear that the worker has “earned” the benefit. As a
matter of optics in politics, employers might also more readily agree to
providing paid sick leaves to more senior employees as opposed to
everyone. But as this Article has already argued,177 paid sick leaves
benefit not only the employee but also the broader public, including the
employer and its workforce. Importantly, the extent of this positive
externality does not depend on the length of the employee’s tenure for a
particular employer: a new employee who can afford to stay at home
while sick can lessen the spread of a virus as effectively as a veteran
worker. Because of government subsidies, concerns of costs are
attenuated, and the current pandemic represents a unique political
environment of support for any legislation for paid sick leaves. Given
these considerations, a federal mandate should provide for a grant of
entitlement rather than require the employees to accrue paid sick time.
Further, any mandated provision of employee benefits must grapple
with the risk of moral hazard, and in particular with absenteeism in the
case of mandated paid sick leaves. If workers receive full wages while on
sick leave, and no monitoring mechanism is in place to ensure they are
actually sick, then employees may take advantage of paid sick leaves
while healthy, resulting in absences from work and unnecessary losses of
productivity. It is for this reason that scholars have suggested generous
but not full wage replacement rates, for example at 70% for paid family

176. See S. 840, 116th Cong. § 5 (2019); Hultin & Follett, supra note 36.
177. See supra Section I.B.
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leaves.178 While recent research may assuage some of the absenteeism
concerns by showing an aggregate decrease in absences from work from
paid sick leaves,179 this result does not necessarily mean that there is no
moral hazard involved at all in mandating sick leaves. The positive
externalities may simply be so large that an overall improvement of
public health has canceled out any possible effect of absenteeism.
Further, other empirical studies have largely confirmed the existence of
at least some absenteeism or shirking behavior in other jurisdictions that
have increased the mandated wage replacement rate for sick leaves to full
(or close to full) pre-leave earnings.180 For these reasons, a generous but
incomplete wage replacement may be desirable for maintaining work
incentives, and somewhere between 70% and 80% payout of pre-leave
earnings seems to strike the right balance and should be set as a minimum
floor for on-leave wages.181
Concerns with absenteeism may present an additional reason for
implementing a paid-sick-leave policy through employer mandate rather
than social insurance. Most countries that have enacted national paidsick-leave policies have done so through employer liability, and even
countries that have implemented general paid-leave (i.e., including
family and medical leaves) policies through social insurance have utilized
a “two-stage” model where short-term leaves (e.g., sick leaves) are
covered by the employer and long-term leaves (e.g., medical leaves) are
covered by social insurance. The rationale behind employer mandate is
that employers are in much better positions (and have much stronger
incentives) to ensure that on-leave employees are indeed sick rather than
merely missing work.182 Because absenteeism-related concerns are
178. See Lester, supra note 130, at 75 (“[T]he percentage of wage replacement should be fairly
generous, perhaps 70% of pre-leave earnings. Less than full wage replacement is also classic check
against moral hazard; a slight but not excessive drop in earnings allows workers to avoid major
shocks to their standard of living while also minimizing frivolous leave-taking and maintaining
work incentives.”).
179. See Stearns & White, supra note 42, at 240 (“[W]e provide the first empirical evidence
that [paid sick leave] mandates in the U.S. may actually decrease the aggregate rate of illness related
leave-taking.”).
180. See, e.g., Per Johansson & Mårten Palme, Moral Hazard and Sickness Insurance, 89 J.
PUB. ECON, 1879, 1889 (2005) (“Three separate results on the effects of the reform obtained in this
study suggest that there is a moral hazard problem in the Swedish sickness insurance.”); Nicolas R.
Ziebarth & Martin Karlsson, The Effects of Expanding the Generosity of the Statutory Sickness
Insurance System, 29 J. APPLIED ECON. 208, 208 (2014) (“There is no evidence that the increase
in sick leave improved employee health, a finding that supports a shirking explanation.”).
181. See also Francesco D’Amuri, Monitoring and Disincentives in Containing Paid Sick
Leave, 49 LAB. ECON. 74 (2017) (finding that absences from work due to sickness are sensitive to
both physician monitoring mechanisms and a 20% cut on wage replacement).
182. See Anke Schliwen et al., The Administration and Financing of Paid Sick Leave, 150 INT’L
LAB. REV. 43, 48–49 (2011) (noting that some countries employ a two-stage model to control absenteeism).
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heightened in the context of paid sick leaves—it is much easier to pretend
to have the flu rather than a serious medical condition such as cancer—
employer monitoring may be especially preferable compared to public
administration with no oversight over on-leave individuals.
Determining the appropriate subsidy level requires attention to two
main goals: mitigating costs and reducing unemployment risks (both of
which will also contribute to overcoming potential political opposition to
paid-sick-leave mandates). As already discussed,183 unemployment risks
are high where employers cannot pass the costs of mandated benefits to
the employees (primarily as a result of wage rigidities and minimumwage regulations) but diminish as the wage income of the employee rises.
Lower-income workers also have the least access to paid sick leaves,
perhaps reflecting a greater magnitude of cognitive bias or less robust
resources to take those biases into account when they enter into the labor
market. An effective cost-reduction strategy, therefore, is to vary the
amount of subsidy in accordance with the (hourly or weekly) wage
income of the employee. Workers paid at or close to minimum wage
should have most of the costs associated with mandated paid sick leaves
reimbursed by the government; as the wage income of the employee
increases, the rate of reimbursement should decrease, until it completely
phases out for highly compensated employees (e.g., as defined by
§ 414(q) of the tax code).184 That is, the government would provide the
employer a tax credit, equivalent to 100% of the employee’s regular
wages, for all on-leave employees who make minimum wage, and
gradually phase out the amount until it reaches zero for employees who
make $130,000 or more. This sliding scale can minimize the risk of
unemployment created by mandated benefits and reduce the taxexpenditure costs to the government. Of course, tax institutions have
comparative expertise in administering social programs whose
implementation requires income measurement: the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) is a good example.
As previously discussed in the Article, mandated paid sick leaves cost
more than replacement wages: employers also incur indirect costs,
including paying for oversight and disruption to the daily operation of
their businesses.185 These indirect costs may in fact constitute a larger
percentage of the total costs associated with providing paid sick leaves
for lower-income workers in comparison with higher-income workers.

183. See supra text accompanying notes 117–118.
184. I.R.C. § 414(q). The current definition of highly compensated employee is anyone with
over $130,000 of income. I.R.S. Notice 2019-59, 2019-47 I.R.B. 1091 (providing the cost-of-living
adjustments for 2020).
185. See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text.
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This is because some institutional costs (e.g., oversight) are more or less
fixed, and because business disruptions are costlier and more salient for
lower-paid service and manufacturing sectors compared to higherincome white-collar work: a Starbucks barista, if sick, must be replaced
before sales suffer, whereas a law firm is unlikely to lose a client (or even
billable hours) if one of its lawyers catches the flu. Due to these indirect
costs, it makes sense to distribute part of the government subsidy to the
employer in addition to the employee, especially in the case of lowerincome workers.
Implementing this aspect of a paid-sick-leave mandate should not pose
serious problems: if the sliding scale for tax credits starts at 100% of
regular wages for minimum-wage employees, and if the government only
mandates a floor of 70% wage replacement rate, this means that 30% of
the reimbursement can reimburse employers for the disruption and other
indirect costs of providing mandated sick leaves to workers with the
lowest wage earnings. As the wage income of the employee increases,
the amount of the tax credit decreases, reflecting the more attenuated risks
of unemployment and increased ability of the employer to pass the costs,
even indirect ones, to the higher-income employees. This aspect of
institutional design echoes Professor Issacharoff’s earlier proposal to
share the funding for paid maternity leaves, with 15% to 40% of the
benefits distributed to the employer and the precise amount depending on
the income of the employee.186 My proposal, however, recommends
precisely the reverse relationship: Professor Issacharoff suggests
increasing the benefit amount to the employer as the income of the
employee increases, whereas this Article suggests decreasing the
reimbursement level to the employer as the income of the employee
increases. This departure stems from fundamental differences in
providing paid sick leaves and providing paid maternity leaves: because
maternity leaves are of long duration, employers must find substitutes for
the on-leave workers, and this process becomes difficult as the
employee’s work becomes more specialized. For sick leaves, disruption
costs dominate and are especially costly for lower-income workers.
The reimbursement can take a variety of forms: payroll tax credits (to
the employer or the employee), business tax credits (to the employer),
and individual income tax credits (to the employee) are all possibilities.
This Article has already addressed the downfalls of payroll-tax funding
due to existing deficits of social-insurance programs and the need to
spread costs to broader society beyond the workforce.187 Distributing the
186. See Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 127, at 2219 (proposing that a portion of pregnancy benefits be paid to the employer, not just the employee).
187. See supra Section III.B.
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reimbursement through individual income tax credits is also undesirable:
individual workers will not be able to receive the benefit until they file
their annual federal tax returns, a time that is often months away, and
varying subsidy rates will require the employer to pay different portions
of replacement wages depending on the wage income level of the
employee, resulting in unnecessary complexity. A business tax credit,
therefore, represents the best option: the employer can keep paying the
employee (with a minimum wage replacement rate set as the floor) and
receive a credit from the government to offset its business taxes.
Importantly, the reimbursement should not take the form of a general
business tax credit (that § 45S currently provides)—instead, the tax credit
should be refundable.188 Otherwise, employers that do not owe any taxes
will not be able to receive the subsidy from the government for providing
the mandated paid sick leaves, and there are substantial inefficiencies and
transactional costs associated with monetizing nonrefundable business
tax credits.189
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In addition to the specific policy intervention of instituting a federally
subsidized mandate of paid sick leaves, this Article’s analysis reveals two
broader lessons. This Part details them and articulates paths for future
research.
A. The Future of Payroll Taxation
A few facts have informed this Article’s critical assessment of funding
paid sick leaves through payroll taxation. First, payroll taxes impose
burdens on wage income only, to the exclusion of other forms of income
(e.g., investment, dividend, and realized gains from dispositions of
property).190 The economic incidence of payroll taxes also mostly falls
on the workers rather than the employers.191 As a result, labor bears the
burden of any welfare program or mandated provision of employee
benefits funded through payroll taxes. Second, federal payroll taxation in
the United States is highly regressive, insofar as lower-income taxpayers
pay a higher portion of their income as payroll taxes compared to higherincome taxpayers. Depending on the precise beneficiaries of the
188. See also Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax
Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24 (2006).
189. See, e.g., Thomas W. Giegerich, The Monetization of Business Tax Credits, 12 FLA. TAX
REV. 709 (2012) (demonstrating the inefficiency of monetizing nonrefundable business tax credits); Michelle D. Layser, Improving Tax Incentives for Wind Energy Production: The Case for a
Refundable Production Tax Credit, 81 MO. L. REV. 453 (2016).
190. See supra Section III.B.
191. See supra note 106.
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expenditures funded by payroll taxes, this type of revenue-raising
structure could produce reverse distribution. Third, when the broader
public stands to benefit from the spending funded through payroll taxes—
that is, when non-wage-earners as well as workers with wage income
benefit from the spending, even if indirectly—a normative basis emerges
for funding the spending through general revenue instead. Put differently,
it is simply unfair to ask wage-earners to foot the bill when taxpayers
without wage income, but who could have substantial income streams
from capital investment or other sources, also receive the goodies.
These empirical and normative recognitions should force
policymakers to question payroll taxation.192 As they currently stand,
federal payroll taxes impose burdens primarily on labor,193 are highly
regressive,194 and arguably fund spending programs that benefit not only
workers but also non-wage-earners (in addition to constantly running at
deficits for the programs they fund).195 Economists have demonstrated
that unemployment insurance, for example, has large positive externality
effects in stimulating aggregate demand, reducing mortgage defaults
(which expands access to credit, raises homeownership, and obviously
improves the health of our banking system), and improving children’s

192. Scholars have already argued that given the current structure of payroll taxation and distribution of tax burdens, additional expenses to pay for the nation’s aging population should not be
financed solely through increases in payroll taxes. See Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary
Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261, 270 (2002) (“To be fair, if new
taxes become necessary to pay for the aging of the nation’s population, they should not be imposed,
as payroll taxes are, solely on labor. This implies using general revenues, which include income
taxes (and, for now at least, estate and gift taxes) for funding the additional government expenditures required by demographic changes.”).
193. See also Linda Sugin, Payroll Taxes, Mythology, and Fairness, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
113, 116 (2014) (arguing that the current structure of payroll and income taxation has resulted in
“dramatically heavier tax liabilities on labor compared to capital, producing substantial horizontal
and vertical inequity in the tax system,” and proposing to “equaliz[e] the tax burdens on labor and
capital income”).
194. Scholars have well documented the structural inequity imposed by payroll taxes, in particular on the working poor. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 864–74 (1987).
195. Preferential tax treatment of capital (e.g., taxing long-term capital gain at a fixed rate that
is usually lower that a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate for ordinary income) is often justified by the
progressivity of the income tax system. See, e.g., Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Optimal Labor Income Taxation 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 18521, 2012). But this
justification holds only tenuously in the United States after the 2017 tax legislation reduced the top
marginal tax rate to 37%, one the of lowest rates since the Great Depression. See TCJA, Pub. L. No
115-97, § 11001, 131 Stat. 2054, 2054 (2017) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Historical Highest Marginal Income Tax Rates, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-highest-marginal-income-tax-rates
[https://perma.cc/K2BBMKJD].
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educational attainment.196 Income from the Social Security program and
retirement benefits lift over twenty million Americans from under the
poverty line.197 Poverty exerts substantial negative externalities on
broader society,198 so large-scale reduction of poverty is a public good.
These observations suggest that social insurance programs benefit the
broader public, which may or may not have wage income, as well as
workers. Such a conclusion lines up with our intuitions: poverty and an
absence of social safety nets could exacerbate crime and adversely affect
human flourishing beyond the poor communities themselves.199 A robust
Medicare program could also lead to improvements in public health and
positive externalities like those associated with a mandate of paid sick
leaves.200 But at the same time, social insurance is funded almost solely
by payroll taxes in the United States. Is it time to overhaul the structure
of payroll taxation? There certainly is a normative basis for spreading the
costs of social insurance programs over a broader swath of society: if paid
sick leaves should be funded through general revenue because a mandate
benefits the public at large, why should social insurance be funded
through payroll taxes when they similarly benefit the public at large?
Again, any resort to political expedience is unpersuasive.201
These issues should spark future research: potential questions include
more precisely quantifying the extent of positive externalities generated
by social insurance programs and considering alternatives to the current
structure of payroll-tax funding. Unemployment insurance has been a
focus of previous studies because different state implementations of
unemployment benefits make empirical studies easier to conduct. We
need more data from other forms of social insurance (e.g., retirement and
disability benefits) to make informed decisions about how much to spread

196. See Joanne Hsu, David Matsa & Brian Melzer, Positive Externalities of Social Insurance:
Unemployment Insurance and Consumer Credit 14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 20353, 2014); Lalive, supra note 46; Krishna Regmi, Examining the Externality of Unemployment Insurance on Children’s Educational Achievement, 57 ECON. INQUIRY 172, 186 (2019).
197. See Kathleen Romig, Social Security Lifts More Americans Above Poverty Than Any Other
Program, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/10-25-13ss.pdf [http://perma.cc/WBK7-XUT7] (describing the positive effects of the Social Security program).
198. See, e.g., Waly Wane, The Optimal Income Tax When Poverty Is a Public ‘Bad’, 82 J. PUB.
ECON. 271, 273 (2001) (describing poverty as an “atmosphere[ic],” “aggregate negative externality
or public ‘bad’ that reduces the utility of the individuals”).
199. For an illustration of this intuition, see George C. Galster, Jackie M. Cutsinger & Ron
Malega, The Social Costs of Concentrated Poverty: Externalities to Neighboring Households and
Property Owners and the Dynamics of Decline, HARV. CTR. HOUSING STUD. (2007),
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/rr07-4_galster.pdf [http://perma.cc/WGM5-72ST]
(describing the generalized effects of a lack of social safety nets).
200. See supra Section I.B.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 156–157.
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costs over the general public, as well as whether to disaggregate types of
payroll taxes (e.g., funding retirement benefits by general revenue but
disability benefits by payroll taxes, if empirical results show that the latter
do not have a substantial positive externality effect). In this respect, this
Article echoes previous calls for social insurance reform,202 including the
possibility of integrating payroll and individual income taxes.203 Further,
any plan to overhaul payroll taxes must propose viable replacements for
the loss of federal revenues, since payroll taxes form the second largest
stream of income (37%) for the federal government.204 Due to potential
constitutional difficulties surrounding the Direct Tax Clause, under
which a federal property or wealth tax may have to be apportioned among
the states,205 the immediate options are likely raising income tax rates or
broadening the tax base. Both are viable: income tax rates have been
lowered by the 2017 tax legislation, and many tax expenditures—such as
exclusion of employer-provided health insurance from income, which
costs at least $150 billion per year206—are ripe for elimination or
limitation.
Again, my call is not to eliminate payroll taxes outright and completely
replace them with income taxes (or for that matter, wealth or consumption
taxes).207 There are many possibilities more moderate than the radical
proposal of integrating payroll and income taxes completely.208 For
example, we might reduce the current regressivity of payroll taxes (which
may already be viewed as unfair regardless of the positive externalities
of the social insurance programs funded by them209). This can be done
by eliminating the cap on the maximum amount of income subject to
202. E.g., ANNE ALSTOTT, A NEW DEAL FOR OLD AGE: TOWARD A PROGRESSIVE
RETIREMENT (2016); DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHO SHOULD PAY FOR MEDICARE? 1 (2004) (“Everyone
agrees about the need for Medicare reform.”).
203. See, e.g., William G. Gale, Tax Reform Options in the Real World, in TOWARD
FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 42 (Alan J. Auerbach, Kevin A. Hassett & Robert D. Burch eds.,
2005).
204. See supra note 145.
205. See supra note 144.
206. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES, supra note 104, at 30.
207. Michael Graetz, in the context of proposing a consumption tax (a valued-added tax at ten
to fourteen percent on a broad base of goods and services) for the United States, has rightly remarked that we should not abolish the payroll taxes given a large shortfall in funding the social
security programs. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE,
FAIR, AND COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES 83, 128, 148 (2008). Rather, any
concrete, promising proposal of reforming payroll taxes should take full account of how to provide
sufficient funding for social security.
208. One such proposal might be found in Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of
the Federal Income and Payroll Taxes on Labor Income, 22 VA. TAX REV. 1, 65 (2002), which
advocates the government “allow workers a refundable credit for a portion of payroll taxes paid
against income tax owed in an amount equal to a reasonable ‘personal exemption’ equivalent.”
209. See ALSTOTT, supra note 202.
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payroll taxes and then lowering the tax rates (or even instituting a
progressive structure of tax rates). The broader point is that the three
recognitions that underpin this Article’s policy intervention—the
regressivity of payroll taxes, the almost exclusive burden imposed by
payroll taxes on labor, and the potential benefits that the broader public
and non-wage-earners stand to receive from payroll-tax-funded
spending—counsel rethinking the role of payroll taxation in our
government. Given these considerations, it is no surprise that many other
advanced economies fund social security programs at least partially by
general revenue.210
B. The Malleability of Tax Institutions
This Article yields a second theoretical payoff by highlighting the
malleability of tax institutions, which could make them attractive,
especially in a crisis where time is of the essence and tax institutions
present readily available, even if imperfect, mechanisms for effectuating
policy ends. Previous scholarship has rightly pointed out the limits of tax
institutions in serving as vehicles of welfare and nontax policies—
inaccuracy, unresponsiveness, and the tradeoff between noncompliance
or underparticipation have emerged as potential comparative
disadvantages of tax institutions.211 Of course, none of these criticisms is
fatal—the point is rather to identify ways to adapt to these shortcomings
or engage in a reasoned process to see whether integration of tax
mechanisms and nontax policies is justified on efficiency-based or
normative grounds.
In particular, three features could emerge as comparative advantages
for using tax institutions to respond to national emergencies. First, tax
institutions allow policymakers to choose the segment of society to
spread the costs of a particular policy. The literature on economic
incidence, while it does not conclusively quantify the precise burdens
imposed by the various taxes, does provide rough guidance that could
suffice in a time-sensitive environment. We know that the payroll tax
imposes burdens primarily on labor, in particular lower-income
households that earn salaries instead of investment proceeds.212 The
individual income tax imposes burden on a larger swath of society,
including all taxpayers without much regard to the sources of their
210. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SSA PUB. NO. 13-11801, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD: EUROPE, 2016 (2016) (showing that Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom are among the countries that fund or
subsidize their social security programs through general revenue, e.g., by income taxes or valueadded taxes).
211. See Alstott, supra note 80, at 570–89.
212. See supra note 106 and text accompanying notes 144–148.
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income, which can come from wages, sales of property, interests, and
dividends, to name a few.213 The corporate income tax distributes at least
a substantial portion of the burden on shareholders (i.e., those with
capital),214 and historical evidence suggests that tariff reductions
generally increase consumer welfare, whereas tariff increases impose
burdens on foreign exporters.215 If a federal wealth tax comes into
existence and survives constitutional scrutiny, it would impose burden
primarily on ultra-high–net-worth households and accumulated wealth.
These tax mechanisms provide policymakers with readily available
implementation methods and a wide latitude in choosing the segment of
society to spread the costs associated with an emergency measure. If a
policy benefits the general public, income-tax (general-revenue) funding
might make sense—this Article’s proposal for a mandate of paid sick
leaves is a good example. If a policy benefits primarily corporations, then
corporate-income-tax funding might be appropriate. Such flexibility is
particularly desirable in emergency situations that do not give the
government the time to design tailored institutions for funding timesensitive policies.
Second, tax institutions enable policymakers to choose from a variety
of implementation methods that present different advantages (and of
course, challenges) with respect to costs, compliance, and cognitive
biases. In particular, the government can decide to what subset of
taxpayers and the public to administer a particular policy that
nevertheless has a broader impact beyond those directly involved in
implementing it. At the broadest level, the government can administer a
subsidy through the individual income tax system, which interfaces with
over 150 million Americans each year (more people file taxes than vote),
thus reaching a substantial portion of the population.216 Certain wealthtransfer programs have been administered in this way, including the
EITC, which represents one of the largest subsidies that the federal

213. I.R.C. § 61(a).
214. See Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know, 20
TAX POL’Y & ECON. 1, 1 (2006).
215. See Douglas A. Irwin, Tariff Incidence: Evidence from U.S. Sugar Duties, 1890–1914, 72
NAT’L TAX J. 599, 599 (2019) (attributing this phenomenon to “the asymmetric response of demand: imports collapse upon a tariff increase, but fail to surge after a tariff reduction”); see also
Douglas A. Irwin, Tariff Incidence in America’s Gilded Age, 67 J. ECON. HIST. 582 (2007) (concluding that the high tariffs in late nineteenth century America redistributed large amounts of income but had a neutral effect on consumers).
216. See Filing Season Statistics for Week Ending December 27, 2019, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/filing-season-statistics-for-week-ending-december-27-2019 [http://perma.cc/53ME3WCV] (showing that 154,865,000 and 155,798,000 individual income tax returns were received by the IRS in 2018 and 2019, respectively).
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government provides to low-income working families.217 But scholars
have criticized this implementation method for (1) unresponsiveness:
taxpayers receive the benefits annually when they file tax returns, and
annual payout does not help families that face constant budgetary
shortfalls or experience a sudden loss of income; and (2) the tradeoff
between underparticipation and compliance: taxpayers have limited
knowledge, and governmental advertisement or sanctions often lead to
either compliance issues where taxpayers receive more than they qualify
for or under-participation issues where taxpayers do not even request the
credit.218 This Article’s analysis of paid sick leaves reveals another
possible disadvantage: cognitive bias. If paid sick leaves are administered
through the individual income tax system, workers will see on their pay
slips that they received no wage income from the employer but would
receive either a tax credit at the end of the year or a reduction in their
withholding taxes. Because taxpayers have limited knowledge of how
withholding taxes or income taxes are computed, they may perceive a
reduction in withholding taxes as worth less than wage income in the
same amount, thus exhibiting salience bias.219
Tax institutions, however, provide other means of administration that
may have a narrower reach but ameliorate issues of cognitive bias,
unresponsiveness, and the tradeoff between compliance and
underparticipation. We know that employers tend to have better
knowledge of the tax system and take steps to limit their cognitive biases
more effectively than employees, so administering a subsidy through
reimbursing the employer for replacement wages sidesteps the issues of
bias and compliance, while also enabling the employee to get paid on a
more regular basis. This is not to say that we should never administer a
welfare or nontax policy through the individual income tax system:
sometimes the broad reach of individual income taxes may outweigh their
associated comparative disadvantages. Indeed, privacy concerns and
antidiscrimination goals may often outweigh the administrability gains
associated with employer implementation: in order to implement the
EITC from the employer’s side,220 employees will have to report their
marital status, number of children, and spousal income to their

217. E.g., Jacob Bastian & Katherine Michelmore, The Long-Term Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Children’s Education and Employment Outcomes, 36 J. LAB. ECON. 1127,
1127–28, 1130 (2018).
218. Alstott, supra note 80, at 570–89.
219. Scholars have theorized exploiting the salience bias in designing taxes. See Deborah H.
Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2011).
220. For example, the federal government may mandate employers to increase the wages of
low-income workers and reimburse businesses for excess wages, instead of granting individual
workers the credits when they file individual income tax returns.

434

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

employers.221 While the tax code and employment law can penalize
businesses for retaliating against employees for claiming an employeradministered EITC, individual-income-tax administration is preferable
because it obviates these concerns with respect to privacy and implicit
bias in the workplace. My point here is that tax institutions provide
flexibility in choosing which segment of the public to engage for
implementing a policy: employers (businesses), employees (individual
taxpayers), large corporations, etc., are all readily available options.
Third, tax institutions provide various mechanisms to limit and tailor
the costs of implementing a policy. These mechanisms include varying
the amounts of subsidies (e.g., by creating a sliding scale in accordance
with the wage income of an employee, as suggested by this Article’s
proposal of a paid-sick-leave mandate).222 Another option is to vary the
form that the subsidy takes: the federal government can distribute a
subsidy as a deduction or an exclusion from income (where the subsidy
amount is a portion of the taxpayer’s expenses depending on tax rates),223
a general business credit (which is nonrefundable and provides limited to
no subsidy to businesses operating at a loss, since they have no tax
liability),224 or a refundable tax credit (where every taxpayer receives
exactly the same benefits assuming a fixed amount of credit).225 The
COVID-19-related payroll tax deferral (provided by the CARES Act) is
a further example: the government can, instead of eliminating tax liability
or granting a deduction, simply defer the payment of taxes so that
taxpayers experiencing temporary shortfalls receive the time value of
money.226 Both the Treasury Department and the Joint Committee on
Taxation provide accurate measurements of these tax expenditures and
have the institutional capacity to assess the estimated costs of such a
policy in a timely manner.
This theory both descriptively explains and normatively grounds the
221. This is because the amount of EITC credit to which an individual is entitled depends on
the income and the size of her household. See I.R.C. § 32.
222. Other prominent examples of phasing out a subsidy include the EITC and the direct payments administered by the IRS as part of the COVID-19 economic stimulus package—the amount
of the stimulus checks phases out starting at $75,000 of income for individual taxpayers. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 2201, 134 Stat. 281, 335
(2020).
223. Precisely for this reason, deductions and exclusions from income have been criticized for
being upside-down subsidies that give a larger tax good to high-income taxpayers (because they
have higher marginal tax rates in a progressive tax system). See generally Boris I. Bittker, Income
Tax Deductions, Credits, and Subsidies for Personal Expenditures, 16 J.L. & ECON. 193 (1973);
Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1159 (1988).
224. See I.R.C. § 38.
225. See Batchelder, Goldberg & Orszag, supra note 188, 24–25 (advocating for a refundable
tax credit).
226. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, § 2302, 134 Stat. at 351.
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federal government’s policymaking during crises. From year to year, we
see that the federal government immediately turns to tax institutions in
responding to emergencies and providing time-sensitive relief to the
economy. During the Great Recession, the government both reduced the
payroll tax rate and sent recovery rebates to taxpayers, the latter of which
alone cost over $100 billion.227 During the current COVID-19 pandemic,
Congress has sent out direct payments (which are, in essence, tax credits
that are immediately refunded to the taxpayer) through the IRS and
deferred payroll taxes.228 Tax institutions have proven popular time and
again during national emergencies precisely because they are malleable
with respect to the three features I have described—funding,
administrability, and costs. A path for further research is to examine these
comparative advantages associated with using tax institutions in
emergencies in conjunction with other available institutional apparatuses.
CONCLUSION
This Article identifies the need for a federal policy of paid sick leaves,
analyzes the current approach embodied in the FFCRA, and proposes an
alternative institutional design to tackle the various problems associated
with mandated employee benefits, including costs and unemployment
risks. As states and localities lift their stay-at-home orders even as
COVID-19 continues to infect thousands of Americans every day, it is
more important than ever for Congress to consider the possibility of
enacting a permanent, subsidized paid-sick-leave mandate.
Beyond the specific policy intervention of paid sick leaves, this Article
also yields two insights on tax institutions. It questions the role of payroll
taxes due to their regressivity, burdens on labor, and capacity to fund
spending that benefits the broader public. It then discusses the
malleability of tax institutions with respect to funding, administrability,
and costs. These features make tax institution perennially popular in
times of crisis to effectuate nontax policies.

227. See Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613 (providing recovery rebates to taxpayers); see also supra note 111 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 114.

